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ABSTRACT 
 The number of women in Latin American governments has significantly increased 
throughout the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. However, women are still significantly 
poorer, less educated, and more prone to disease and death than their male counterparts. If 
women‟s representation is improving, why has their quality of life remained the same? Using 
quantitative methods and a sample of 18 Latin American countries over a time span of twenty 
years, this work evaluates the possible affects electoral, political party, and quota law institutions 
may have on the substantive representation of women. The findings support what is assumed in 
extant literature; the level of women‟s descriptive representation best predicts the level of 
women‟s substantive representation in Latin America. Electoral, party, and quota law institutions 
are important but they do not appear to be as vital to SRW as is DRW. The findings further 
suggest that micro-measures of SRW need to be produced in order to better evaluate the effects 
of policy on women‟s lives. Finally, it is noted that theories of legislative marginalization and 
critical mass should be explored as they may better inform the structure of future works on SRW.  
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 
 
The number of women in government has significantly increased throughout the 
twentieth and twenty-first centuries with no country left unaffected by this massive shift in 
women‟s participation (Paxton and Hughes, 2007; Schwindt-Bayer, 2010; Xydias, 2010). The 
democracies of Latin America have been especially affected, with more than half of the region‟s 
countries adopting policies aimed at increasing the number of women in parliament (Paxton and 
Hughes, 2007). Yet while there are more women in legislatures than ever before, more female 
politicians and policy-makers, and more women involved in the professional segment of labor, 
statistics do not show a simultaneous improvement in women‟s well-being (United Nations 
Gender Statistics, 2007). For instance, women still take home significantly less income than men 
in their chosen field, typically earning only 70% of what men take home (United Nations Gender 
Statistics, 2007). Women are also at greater risk for obesity, heart disease, and death during 
childbirth while being more than twice as susceptible to sexually transmitted diseases as 
compared to men (United Nations Gender Statistics, 2007). Lastly, women are the most 
impoverished portion of society. While they make up half of the world‟s population, they 
represent a staggering 70% of the world‟s poor (United Nations Gender Statistics, 2007). With 
the number of women in government at an all-time high, why have women‟s lives not 
significantly improved? 
 In June of 2009, the UN issued a report on the changing roles of working women in Latin 
America. Included in this report is an important statistic: the number of women active in the 
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labor market in Latin America increased from 32% in 1990 to 53% in 2008. However, the report 
simultaneously states that, “while today, women and men work, there has been no similar 
process of change in redistribution of domestic workload. Nor have public services that support 
such duties been improved significantly – and there has been little change towards reorganization 
of social life” (UN Development Programme, 2008: 1). In other words, while over 100 million 
Latin American women have entered into the formal labor force over the last two decades, there 
has been, at least according to the UN, little change in the social structures dominating women‟s 
lives in the region. Women may now be working in the formal labor sector but they are still 
expected to be the primary caretaker of the home. To remedy this problem, both the ILO 
(International Labour Organization) and the UN Development Programme (UNDP) recommend 
better representation of women in labor negotiations, better day provisions and more flexible 
work hours for women if a positive reconciliation between work and family is to be achieved. 
These same two organizations also call this reconciliation, “a fundamental aspect for promoting 
equality in the world of work and for reducing poverty” (UN Development Programme, 2008: 2-
3). After more than twenty years of entering the Latin American labor force in increasing 
numbers, why do women still make less than men, still have less bargaining power at the labor 
table, and are still seen as the sole caretaker of the home?  
 In 1979, anthropologist June Nash published We Eat the Mines and the Mines Eat Us: 
Dependency and Exploitation in Bolivian Tin Mines. This benchmark work, printed nearly forty 
years ago, includes accounts of life for women in labor which often differ little from women‟s 
lives today (French and James, 1998). Women, at the time, faced harsh living and wage 
conditions within the mine and mining communities. They also faced subordination to their male 
co-workers which led to poor hours, long shifts, and difficulty in caring for children. At the time 
 3 
of French and James‟ (1998) publication, meant to build upon the work of Nash, securing the 
same rights as men in factory and mining sectors was still a significant struggle for women in 
many countries of Latin America. This is especially evident in Brazil and Columbia where 
female workers report abuse, rape and unequal working conditions. As of 2012, the UN‟s Report 
on Gender Statistics continues to reflect these harsh truths for women in the region. There is a 
pervading atmosphere of male domination and myriad complaints of the unfair treatment of 
women across many different circumstances (Craske, 1999). 
 Another indicator of great importance to Latin American women is the prevalence of 
domestic violence. Unfortunately, this region, like so many others, has long suffered from a 
silent epidemic of spousal and child abuse (Craske, 1999). One story makes the effects of this 
violence particularly clear. In November of 2011, Olga Vasquez, a native of Guatemala, reported 
to Vivian Siu of Unicef that she suffered at the hands of her brutal father nearly every day of her 
seventeen years of life. After conceiving a child and being turned out of her home, Ms. Vasquez 
sought help only to be turned away because of limited facilities and resources. At the time of the 
report, Ms. Vasquez had returned to her abusive home and, although fearing for her life, agreed 
to speak to Ms. Siu under the guise of anonymity in an attempt to bring this problem to the 
attention of a greater audience (Siu, 2011). Although the United Nations formally implemented 
the International Day for the Elimination of Violence against Women (November 25) in 1999, 
and it has been marked as a day against violence since 1981, there is still a stigma present in 
Latin America quietly prohibiting the punishment of most crimes against women for fear of 
retaliation (http://www.un.org/en/events/endviolenceday/) (Siu, 2011).   
The Law against Sexual Violence, Exploitation, and Human Trafficking passed in 2009 
calls for increased sentences for violent crimes against children, complete with increased fines 
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and imprisonment terms if the perpetrator is a relative. Yet it is estimated that 90% of crimes 
against women in Latin America are left unreported (UNICEF, 2011). With the push for stricter 
sentencing and the higher visibility given to the issue via international organizations, it is 
surprising that the region‟s violent crime statistics against women have not decreased more 
significantly. Instead, Latin America continues to be plagued with inequality for its female 
citizens in yet another way (QuotaProject.org, 2012). All of these things, again, beg a very 
serious question. With the workforce opportunities that have developed for women in the region, 
the increased number of women in parliament, and the international attention being given to the 
problem of domestic violence and abuse has anything actually changed in the day to day lives of 
Latin American women? 
In an attempt to explain this puzzling set of circumstances, researchers have proposed 
five main institutional explanations for the disparity between better representation and women‟s 
social and economic plight. These include electoral system factors, international influence, 
political party factors, political culture, and mobilization (Caul, 2001; Baldez, 2004; Htun and 
Jones, 2002; Meier, 2000). But none of these explanations has yet to produce a widely accepted 
understanding of why an increase in social opportunities and electoral representation has not led 
to an increased standard of living for women in the countries of Latin America. Thus, a second 
area of study has developed which focuses on quota laws as they relate to women‟s 
representation. Perhaps, it is believed, quota laws are the missing link. It may be that they are 
needed to increase women‟s presence in parliament to some arbitrary level at which point a 
cultural shift in parliament will occur and women will be given more policy preference leading 
to better lives (Bratton, 2005; Celis et al., 2008). This theory of critical mass, however, has not 
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proven to be logically sound or empirically supported and researchers have turned toward more 
holistic approaches.  
Leslie Schwindt-Bayer‟s 2010 publication, Political Power and Women’s Representation 
in Latin America, is one of the first holistic assessments of the reality of women‟s representation 
as it relates to all six of the possible explanatory categories listed above. Although she is unable 
to incorporate all of these factors into her analyses, she contributes a valuable amount of 
information regarding some of the heftiest explanatory variables as they relate to the substantive 
representation of women. Schwindt-Bayer is one of the first researchers to base a holistic 
concept of women‟s representation on the 1972 work of Hannah Pitkin. Many researchers have 
since begun to consider thicker concepts of representation and to include more than one or two 
institutional explanations in their work (Celis et al., 2008). It is from these advancements in 
research on women‟s representation that this dissertation bases its further contribution to the 
literature.  
What is presently missing from research on women‟s representation as it relates to 
various institutions is an empirical analysis that combines a holistic concept of representation 
with what the literature deems to be the most significant categories of  institutional variables. In 
other words, there have been few attempts to combine the theoretical and empirical works on 
women‟s substantive representation into one comprehensive study (Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler, 
2005; Schwindt-Bayer, 2010). Furthermore, the majority of empirical research on women‟s 
representation has been conducted either in the advanced, industrialized nations of the West or in 
controlled area studies (such as Eastern Europe and South and Eastern Asia). There have been 
even fewer attempts to pursue large-N studies that may produce findings that are generalizable to 
developing areas with different cultural, geographical, and political circumstances (Beckwith, 
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2002; Celis et al., 2008; Childs, 2003). This dissertation fills these perceived gaps by 
synthesizing the important theoretical and empirical findings in extant literature and evaluating 
these factors across a larger number of countries, though still regionally bound, in hopes of 
finding information that is generalizable to other developing area. The goal is to provide an 
overview of women‟s representation as it relates to the common institutions that shape politics in 
any country.  
The importance of this undertaking should not be underestimated. Because women exist 
in every nation of the world, improving their quality of life has globalized, not localized, 
implications. Not only does the inclusion of women into politics mean a newly established voice 
in government but it is argued that the inclusion of multiple viewpoints in the deliberative 
process works to strengthen democracy (Mill, 1989). With many developing democracies 
struggling to consolidate, finding a way to increase women‟s representation may significantly 
bolster the chances for democratic survival in these nations (Htun and Jones, 2002; Kathlene, 
1998; Mill, 1989). What‟s further, incorporating women into the formal labor force not just in 
higher numbers but with better pay and working conditions, may allow countries to create a 
larger tax base, helping to improve or implement infrastructure so that economic conditions may 
be improved for the country overall (Htun and Jones, 2002; Kathlene, 1998; Schwindt-Bayer, 
2010). Increasing women in the formal work force increases human capital, the key factor of 
production in developing nations. This improves a country‟s overall economic output, especially 
if these female laborers become skilled. Furthermore, because women are typically seen as the 
primary caregivers for the children in nations, their increased well-being should help improve the 
chances of survival, literacy, and economic productivity for future generations. This further 
secures the expansion and survival of democracy by fostering generations capable of actively 
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participating in the democratic process and contributing to the country‟s coffers through 
participation in the formal labor force (Htun and Jones, 2002; Kathlene, 1998; Mill, 1989; 
Schwindt-Bayer, 2010). These are only a few examples of the possible outcomes that may come 
to bear if women‟s representation is legitimately improved. Although this dissertation focuses 
specifically on the region of Latin America, the plight for women is similar in many developing 
areas. Finding a way to bridge the gap between increased numbers of women in government and 
an actual increase in the substantive representation of women has far-reaching and important 
implications for many of the world‟s contemporary democracies.  
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CHAPTER II: LITERATURE REVIEW 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Throughout Latin America, the number of women in government has increased steadily 
over the past several decades. This is most easily observed when one compares the percent 
change in female parliamentarians across countries and time. Table 1 highlights this shift over a 
randomly chosen sample of Central American, South American and Caribbean countries. The 
average increase in female parliamentarians from 1997-2010, a relatively brief time span, is 8.76 
percent. In some countries, such as Mexico and Nicaragua, the percent of women in parliament 
virtually doubles during this time. Ecuador and Peru posts even more drastic rises in female 
participation. 
    Table 1 
 % Change of Women  in Lower or Single House 
    
  1997 2000 2005 2010 
% 
Change 
Country 
    
  
  
    
  
Argentina 27.6 26.5 36.2 38.5 10.9 
Bolivia 
 
11.5 16.9 22.3 10.8 
Chile 7.5 10.8 15 14.2 6.7 
Colombia 11.7 11.8 12.1 8.4 -3.3 
Dominican Republic 11.7 16.1 17.3 19.7 8 
Ecuador 3.7 14.6 16 32.3 28.6 
El Salvador 15.5 9.5 10.7 
 
-4.8 
Guatemala 12.5 8.8 8.2 12 -0.5 
Mexico 14.2 16 24.2 27.6 13.4 
Nicaragua 10.8 9.7 20.7 20.7 9.9 
Peru 10.8   18.3 27.5 16.7 
Source: Inter-Parliamentary Union 
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While women certainly occupy more seats in Latin American legislatures, they are also rising 
through the ranks of political parties and bureaucracies to occupy positions as powerful as the 
presidencies in Brazil, Chile, Argentina, Costa Rica and Nicaragua and governorships in Mexico. 
Furthermore, there has been an increase in Latin American women‟s cabinet presence starting 
with less than 10% representation in 2000 and expanding up to 25% in 2010 (Htun and Jones, 
2002; CIA World Leader‟s Database, 2010).  
 Simultaneously, all of the countries in Latin America (including Argentina, Bolivia, 
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela) have adopted 
policies specifically aimed at increasing the number of women in parliament, raising the regional 
average of female parliamentarians from 12.9% in January of 1997 to 23.9% in December of 
2012 (quotaproject.org 2010)
1
. The adoption of quota laws, and the type of quota law adopted, is 
mostly unique to the country in question. However, the speed and thoroughness with which Latin 
American countries have adopted quota laws has led scholars to seek a regionally driven 
explanation for this trend (Araujo and Garcia, 2006; Costa Benavides, 2003; Dahlerup, 2006; 
Franeschet and Piscopo, 2008; Jones, 2009). Researchers have proposed that external pressures 
from international groups are forcing party and government leaders to open politics to women, as 
this is seen as the norm set by Western states (Paxton and Hughes, Frechette et al., 2008; 
Kathlene, 1998; Krook, 2009). This explanation is not limited to the adoption of quotas in Latin 
America but is also used to explain this phenomenon in parts of Africa and Central and Eastern 
Europe (Devlin and Elgie, 2008; Goetz, 2003; Jaquette and Wolchik, 1998; Meena, 2003). 
                                                          
1
 1997 is the earliest year for which the IPU begins regularly recording women‟s presence in Latin American 
parliaments. Prior to 1997, there are only sporadic entries for Latin American countries with little overlap between 
one country and another on years measured. Thus, although this dissertation looks at the twenty year period between 
1990 and 2010, some of the descriptive data used is not available until the late 1990s.  
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Furthermore, increased awareness of gender disparity in politics, attributed to heightened 
governmental transparency (intensified by the United Nations Decade of Women and continuing 
on today through the efforts of CEDAW
2
 and similar organizations) is also commonly cited as an 
explanation for Latin America‟s willingness to embrace the adoption of quotas (Beckwith, 2000; 
Celis et al., 2008; Craske, 1999; Kaiser, 2001). Finally, there is the simple speculation that a 
snowball effect may be at work, pushing countries in close proximity to adopt similar policies 
(Kittilson, 2005; Matland, 1998). Regardless of a state‟s motivation for adopting quota laws, the 
graph below shows that those countries in Latin America that have adopted quota laws, have 
achieved more stable and greater increases in the percentages of female parliamentarians than 
those countries in which quota laws do not exist.
3
 
Scholars generally agree that increased numbers of women in Latin American politics 
should have positive impacts on Latin American states (Beckwith and Cowell-Meyers, 2003). 
But what exactly are the positive impacts on women‟s representation? In Hannah Pitkin‟s (1967) 
seminal work, she defines four facets of representation that are related but still distinct from one 
another.
4
 The evidence presented above shows an increase in what Pitkin calls the descriptive 
representation of women (DRW). This type of representation describes a representative as 
„standing for‟ a constituent. In other words, the representative and the constituent share some sort 
of social characteristic such as gender, race, ethnicity, or class and thus the representative is 
literally a „stand-in‟ for a similar group of peoples who are expected to share concerns on these 
ascripted identities (Norris and Franklin, 1997). 
                                                          
2
 CEDAW is the acronym for the Convention to Eliminate all Forms of Discrimination Against Women, which was 
adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1979 and is now managed by the High Commissioner for Human Rights in 
Geneva. 
3
 It is important to note that there are far more countries with quota laws than without (15:4). Also, there is no 
differentiation made between the types of quotas these countries have adopted in the data used to create these 
graphs.  
4
 Pitkin‟s four facets of representation are formal, symbolic, descriptive and substantive.  
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Figure 1 
Percentage of Women in Parliament  
by Presence of Quota Laws 
Latin America 1999-2012 
 
Source:  www.quotaproject.org 
 
On the other hand, substantive representation (SRW) is defined as a representative „acting 
for‟ his or her constituency. This may be further described as a representative “acting in the 
interests of the represented in a manner responsive to them” (1967: 209). Ultimately, Pitkin‟s 
distinction between these two facets of representation boils down to the election of an individual 
because of a similarity in appearance without regard for the confluence of political desires or 
ideology, versus the election of an individual based upon similar political policy concerns and an 
expectation of responsiveness based on a common agenda (Pitkin, 1967). The consensus within 
the research community is that SRW is more important to achieve for those seeking improved 
representation than is DRW (Beckwith, 2002; Celis and Childs, 2008; Celis et al., 2008; Childs, 
2003; Paxton and Hughes, 2007). It is a fairly easy task to fill legislative seats with 
representatives who look like their constituents, but how do you know if they also think about, 
and act on, the interests of those constituents? All of this information presents researchers with 
0
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an intriguing puzzle. Have the historically high numbers of women in legislatures, cabinets, 
bureaucracy, and executive positions in South and Central America and the Caribbean impacted 
the substantive representation of Latin American women?  
Although this is a pressing question, measuring substantive representation has been a 
challenge for many researchers (Mackay, 2008; Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler, 2005; Schwindt-
Bayer, 2010; Xydias, 2010). Importantly, while using Pitkin‟s (1967) definition of SRW is 
common practice throughout SRW literature, it does not perfectly capture what many projects 
aim to measure. There is discord between the adoption of Pitkin‟s conception of SRW as 
„representatives acting for constituents‟ and the desire to observe the real-world affects of 
government policies on women‟s lives and rights. However, its usefulness and the absence of a 
better suited, and well accepted, definition of SRW informs the decision to adopt Pitkin‟s 
concept of SRW here. A second, but corollary, problem is the lack of micro-data available from 
which to study the real-world outcomes of government policy in Latin American women‟s lives. 
Although there are some studies, notably Matland and Taylor‟s (1997) work on Costa Rica, 
which codes and uses actual policy outcomes to gauge levels of SRW, the difficulty of collecting 
such data is prohibitive. Instead, researchers most often use macro, or aggregate, data.  
The most common macro indicators used in studies of SRW have included measures of 
women‟s enrollment in secondary education, the number of women participating in the formal 
labor force, female fertility rates, and maternal mortality rates (Celis et al., 2008; Schwindt-
Bayer and Mishler, 2005; Schwindt-Bayer, 2010). These variables aim to capture both the health 
and socioeconomic characteristics of Latin American women, as a distinct population, as their 
quality of life changes over time (Celis et al., 2008; Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler, 2005; 
Schwindt-Bayer, 2010). Using these measures we are confronted with interesting results. It 
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seems that although, as observed above, the number of women in parliaments has continued to 
increase, the indicators surrounding women‟s quality of life show no similar stable trend. The 
observations are somewhat erratic for variables such as secondary school enrollment, showing 
sharp dips over a period of time when we find increases in DRW to be more reliably trending 
upward. In contrast, the measures of women‟s fertility rates show more uniform declines. 
However, because a decrease in women‟s fertility is widely interpreted as a sign of improvement 
in the quality of life for women, the relatively small numbers posted by Latin American countries 
in a little over a decade lead researchers to question whether DRW directly affects SRW (Celis 
and Childs, 2008; Reingold, 2006).  
 
Figure 2 
% of Women’s Enrollment in Secondary Education 
By Country by Year 
 
Source: World Bank Gender Statistics  
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Figure 3 
Women’s Fertility Rates5 
By Country by Year 
 
Source: World Bank Gender Statistics 
 
 Thus, some researchers have proposed that assumed linkages between DRW and SRW 
are best explained by the distinct institutional arrangements of the individual country in study 
(Celis et al., 2008). Most commonly, researchers theorize that levels of SRW vary according to a 
country‟s electoral rules, distinct party organizations, and the presence or absence of quota laws 
(Dahlerup, 2006; Carey and Shugart, 1995; Taagepera and Shugart, 1989, Schwindt-Bayer and 
Mishler, 2005; Schwindt-Bayer, 2010). Other cultural and socioeconomic factors are commonly 
introduced into studies in order to control for additional variations that often exist between states. 
These factors include Freedom House scores (measuring a state‟s level of democracy) 
GDP per capita, and the dominant religion (Schwindt-Bayer, 2010). Because the increase in 
female politicians is not unique to Latin America, but is rather a global trend, researchers have 
undertaken quantitative studies addressing women‟s representation across multiple regions. 
                                                          
5
 It must be noted that these variables do take time to manifest change, but it is still worth mentioning that these 
declines are very small compared to the large increases in women‟s parliamentary presence over the same decade 
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However, the vast majority of literature linking the increased number of female representatives 
to changes in women‟s substantive representation involves small-N studies conducted in 
industrialized, Western nations (Beckwith, 2002; Celis et al., 2008; Celis and Childs, 2008; Htun 
and Jones, 2006; Mackay, 2008; Taylor-Robinson and Heath, 2003; Xydias, 2010). Those 
studies that do focus on developing nations are typically limited to no more than three countries 
observed over fewer than ten years (Celis et al., 2008; Mackay, 2008). The differences between 
these two categories of states lies firstly in the level of democracy achieved by Western states 
that has not been approximated by most developing countries. Furthermore, developing countries 
have lower GDPs, are typically non-service sector oriented, and are dominated by non-protestant 
religions. Taken together, these three factors constitute a reasonable argument for avoiding 
generalizing findings from studies conducted in industrialized, Western nations to the lesser 
developed nations of Latin America. Thus, it is important that studies of SRW are expanded to 
LDCs.  
 With the focus turned firmly toward developing countries, I plan to adapt the theories 
proposed by previous researchers which argue that the structure of electoral institutions, the 
structure of party institutions, and the adoption of quota laws affect SRW. Using these three 
main areas of institutional interest, I perform multiple empirical analyses that deal with problems 
specific to data collection in lesser developed nations (such as missing data points).  I choose to 
use the twenty year period between 1990 and 2000 in conjunction with a large N study of 18 
countries. My justification for using this time frame lies mainly with the timing of the adoption 
of quota laws in Latin America. The vast majority of these laws were put into place in the early 
to mid-1990s and, thus, researchers should just be capable of observing measurable changes in 
indicators as a result of these new policies (Dodson, 2006; Miguel, 2008; Tripp and Kang, 2008). 
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However, a second value added by choosing this time period is increased data reliability. From 
1990 forward, the reporting of data in developing countries, especially in Latin America, appears 
to become more stable. There are fewer missing data points and more reliable collection 
methods, making conclusions drawn from the data more reliable overall (De Boef and Keele, 
2008).  
 I choose to focus these analyses on Latin America for several reasons. First, it increases 
the generalizability of the findings. Most of the countries of Latin America have transitioned 
from authoritarian to democratic regimes, allowing the findings to be applied to other countries 
with regimes in which the leaders are selected by, and theoretically accountable to, the electorate 
(Samuels and Shugart, 2003; Samuels, 2004). Furthermore, the variation found in Latin America 
makes it a useful test of institutional theories as the region offers wide variation on the levels of 
women‟s descriptive and substantive representation, district sizes, and electoral rules. While 
many of the countries in the region have adopted quota laws, several have not. Also important is 
the existence of a large enough sample size to allow for more reliable quantitative work than is 
available in many other developing regions (Schwindt-Bayer, 2010). Lastly, there is less 
variation in socioeconomics across Latin American countries than in other developing regions, 
such as Africa. This allows for a control of SES that may not be possible in other parts of the 
world. This does not assume that all Latin American countries are economically identical but the 
wealth distribution and median GDP are very similar throughout Central and South America and 
the Caribbean (United Nations Development Indicators, 2012). From a normative standpoint, 
these advantages to studying SRW in Latin America will allow comparative political scientists to 
build upon a set of findings that can inform analyses in other developing regions or possibly to 
countries with similar institutional or cultural characteristics. 
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 The importance of this study lies in its potential to advance the scholarly understanding 
of how state institutions impact women‟s substantive representation, both negatively and 
positively. If the results of this study can then be compared to previous studies conducted on 
developed countries, we may have the ability to single out institutional arrangements that have 
similar affects on SRW. Policy recommendations may then be made to help improve the quality 
of life for women on a global scale. In other words, my hope is that this study will help us better 
understand how to optimize SRW everywhere, especially as women are currently the poorest, 
sickest, and most oft-exploited group of citizens (United Nations Gender Statistics, 2012). A 
deepening of democracy and democratic practices demands that the majority of voices in society 
be heard. The continued under representation of women leaves all democracies, especially those 
in their nascent stages, at risk of failure (Mill, 1989; Norris and Franklin, 1997; Young, 2002). 
By examining societal indicators aimed at capturing women‟s quality of life in the countries of 
Latin America, we may find that leaders must change their policies in order to better embrace the 
growing calls for women‟s political participation. 
2. THE CULTURAL IDENTITY OF LATIN AMERICAN WOMEN 
The Historical Context of Women in Latin America 
 Latin America has a long history deeply entangled in its legacy of colonialism. The 
Spanish and Portuguese conquests of the fifteenth century leave a lasting cultural impression 
upon the entire region, which does not fully gain its independence until well into the nineteenth 
century (Craske, 1999). Not only does Southern Europe import its languages to Latin America 
but it also brings with it Catholicism. The conservative, hierarchical doctrine of Catholicism 
impresses its own vision of family life and „womanhood‟ onto the existing cultures of the region, 
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subjugating women to male authority and separating women economically in accordance to class 
and ethnicity (Pescatello, 1973). This patriarchal social organization dominates Latin America, 
and is reinforced equally by imported European law, religion, and tradition while being 
simultaneously bolstered by the existing cultural institutions of the region (Andrien, 2004; 
Migden Socolow, 2000).   
 The pre-Columbian society of Latin America is marked by a degree of „gender 
parallelism‟ (Andrien, 2004; Migden Socolow, 2000). This translates into a belief in separate 
social structures and cultural configurations for men and women. Each sex is perceived as 
distinct and is assigned with separate responsibilities. However, the roles of both sexes are 
acknowledged as necessary for the survival of society (Migden Socolow, 2000). Scholars tell us 
that this complementarity of pre-Columbian gender roles should not be mistaken as equality 
between men and women (Andrien, 2004; Craske, 1999; Migden Socolow, 2000). Men clearly 
held a superior position in the gender hierarchy before the arrival of the conquistadores (Andrien, 
2004). Thus, although it is rarely defined in the modern term of patriarchy, women in pre-
Columbian America were, much like the women of Iberia, in a clearly secondary position in  
terms of social, economic, and political power (Migden Socolow, 2000:30). Thus, a clear sexual 
hierarchy places women below men in both the New World as in the Old.
6
  
 Of equal importance for the position of women in society is the Catholic Church. As its 
power and influence solidifies over time, Colonial Latin America becomes a deeply religious 
society (Andrien, 2004). All of its inhabitants are called upon to subscribe to one dogma and to 
                                                          
6
 It is also important to note that further delineations were made along the lines of class and ethnicity. Depending 
upon social status, place of birth, and ethnic background, women would be relegated to „better‟ or worse strata of 
living. While wealthy women were relegated to housework, impoverished and mextizo women were made to be 
laborers outside of the home (Migden Socolow, 2000). Thus, while sex was an important indicator of one‟s station 
in life, other determinants also affected one‟s fate.  
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one set of religious beliefs: that of the Holy Roman Catholic Church (Andrien, 2004; Migden 
Socolow, 2000). Again, these beliefs entail a rigid set of organized social interactions designed 
to separate the male and female spheres of life so as to preserve the family and with it the social 
and economic status of Latin America‟s inhabitants (Andrien, 2004; Craske, 1999). The church 
is virtually omnipresent throughout the colonies and while it is believed that women had a 
relatively minor role in the religious rituals of pre-Columbian societies, this role is likely much 
further reduced after the region‟s conquest (Migden Socolow, 2000). In sum, over centuries, the 
Holy Roman Catholic Church helps to define and enforce the gender roles of Latin America, 
deeply affecting the lives, choices, and histories of Hispanic women (Andrien, 2004).  
Women’s Role in Contemporary Latin American Society 
 As the nineteenth and twentieth centuries dawn, the legacies left by pre-Columbian 
tradition and Catholicism‟s patriarchal dogma continue to define the lives of men and women in 
Latin America (Craske, 1999; Pescatello, 1973). The culturally ascripted and long accepted 
gender roles are best described by two common terms: „marianismo‟ and „machismo‟. 
Marianismo essentially arises as an answer to Latin America‟s machismo which is the 
combination of an Aztec word meaning „wisdom and leadership‟ and the Spanish word „macho‟ 
which is strictly masculine in nature (Ingoldsby, 1991). After the conquest, these two ideas 
merge to form a powerful new concept of masculine honor that is to be respected and imitated 
(Arciniega et al., 2008). Although contemporary stereotypes often depict machismo as an overly-
sexed, overly-aggressive, „macho‟ loser, machismo in Latin American culture is more a 
description of hegemonic masculinity (Arciniega et al., 2003). In this conception, men are to 
embody bravery, courage, and strength as well as wisdom and leadership, making masculinity 
superior to the more motherly attributes of femininity (Arciniega et al., 2003; Ingoldsby, 1991).  
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 Marianismo, in contrast, describes women as archetypes of nature, mother, wife, and 
concubine (Arciniega et al., 2003; Chaney, 1979; Jaquette and Pescatello, 1973). Women are 
seen as both passive and pure, defined by motherhood throughout Latin American culture 
(Chaney, 1979; Jaquette and Pescatello, 1973; Schwindt-Bayer, 2010). In fact „Motherhood‟ has 
always loomed large in images and representations of women in Latin America. This partly 
reflects the importance of motherhood in the realities of women‟s lives but it also fails to 
recognize the other identities available to Latin American women such as employee, student, 
spiritual leader, or entrepreneur (Chaney, 1979; Craske, 1999; Jaquette and Pescatello, 1973). 
Furthermore, women are seen as strengthened by abnegation, yielding to the desires of men, 
especially within the family. For example, in a Bogota barrio studied by Jaquette and Pescatello 
(1973), women rarely make important family decisions such as where to live and whether to 
have children (236). In Argentina, husbands (at the time the book was written) retain legal 
control over women‟s wages even when women gain legal equality in the labor market (Jaquette 
and Pescatello, 1973: 144). The women in these examples admit to submitting to these demands 
as part of their „duties‟ as women (Jaquette and Pescatello, 1973). Women are thus seen as the 
saints and martyrs of the home and community, sacrificing personal happiness and success so 
that the traditional patriarchal hierarchy continues on uninterrupted. This „supermadre‟ of years 
past continues to overshadow the personal identity of Latin American women today, who are 
expected to raise the children, often alone, maintain the home, earn some form of income, and to 
worship devoutly (Schwindt-Bayer, 2006).  
 This close identification with motherhood and the lack of power afforded Latin American 
women has relegated much of their lives to the private sphere (Chant and Craske, 2003; Craske, 
1999; Schwindt-Bayer, 2010). The woman‟s place continues to be seen as „in the home‟ and 
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women are often legally, or privately, discouraged from participating in the public sphere (Chant 
and Craske, 2003; Schwindt-Bayer, 2010). This is especially true in the most socially 
conservative Latin American countries, such as Peru, Bolivia, and Ecuador. Women are seen as 
responsible for the home and family while men are responsible for generating income and 
participating in politics (Chant and Craske, 2003; Schwindt-Bayer, 2006; Schwindt-Bayer, 
2010). This distinctly separates the sexes into two spheres of existence: the „private‟, or 
woman‟s, sphere and the „public‟, or man‟s, sphere (Chant and Craske, 2003; Craske, 1999; 
Schwindt-Bayer, 2010). Yet poverty has driven women to supplement incomes, creating a 
booming informal labor market in which women produce and sell goods from the home adding 
yet another dimension to both the importance of women in the Latin American family and the 
reinforcement of women‟s position outside of traditional labor markets (Chant and Craske, 2003; 
Craske, 1999; Richards and Gelleny, 2007; Schwindt-Bayer, 2006).  
Overall, the male-defined image of the Latin American woman places her squarely in 
moral, economic, and social subjugation (Chant and Craske, 2003; Jaquette and Pescatello, 
1973). Yet, there have been decided gains made for women over the course of the twentieth 
century. Although informal labor markets may reinforce the woman‟s place in the „private‟ 
sphere, they also provide women with a means of independent earning that allows them to 
support a home, however meagerly, regardless of the presence of a male figure. Furthermore, by 
1961 all Latin American women had both the right to vote and the right to stand for office 
(ipu.org: http://www.ipu.org/wmn-e/suffrage.htm).  
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Table 2: Dates of Women's Enfranchisement in 
Latin America 
Ecuador 1929       
Brazil 1932 
   Uruguay 1932 
   Cuba 1934 
   El Salvador 1939 
   Dominican Republic 1942 
   Panama 1945 
   Guatemala 1945 
   Costa Rica 1945 
   Venezuela 1947 
   Argentina 1947 
   Chile 1949 
   Bolivia 1952 
   Mexico 1953 
   Honduras 1955 
   Nicaragua 1955 
   Peru 1955 
   Columbia 1957 
   Paraguay  1961    
Source: Compiled by the author using data from the Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2012 
Women also have the protected right to attend primary school and the right to pursue secondary 
and tertiary educations, if financially possible (United Nations Gender Statistics, 2007). New 
laws against domestic violence are being introduced alongside bills that ensure maternity leave 
for expectant mothers (Carroll, 2001; Childs and Withey, 2004; Johnson, 2002; Macaulay, 
2000). Although these may seem like small steps in countries with well-established laws 
protecting women in both the home and workplace, the formation of groups and the introduction 
of legislation aimed at improving the lives of women in Latin America mark a true shift in the 
region‟s cultural attitude (Chant and Craske, 2003). Perhaps some of these changes are owed to 
the policies of Vatican II, beginning in 1962, as the Catholic Church‟s dominating regional 
presence modernized its stance on the poor and underrepresented, of which women make up a 
substantial percentage (Chant and Craske, 2003, Craske, 1999; Jaquette and Pescatello, 1973). 
Whatever the catalyst, the social, educational, and physical opportunities for Latin American 
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women have substantially increased since the early 1900s. The social opportunities for women in 
contemporary Latin American society have definitely increased but this speaks little to whether 
or not these increased opportunities have yielded an improved quality of life. 
3. WOMEN IN LATIN AMERICAN POLITICS   
Non-Democratic Regimes and Latin American Women  
Women‟s participation in Latin American politics has also risen dramatically throughout 
the twentieth century, with much of this increase concentrated over the last several decades. The 
1980s saw the final wave of non-democratic regimes in the region topple, re-defining the way(s) 
in which women are able to participate in the political realm (Chant and Craske, 2003; Craske, 
1999). It is important to note that the type of regime in place prior to the most current wave of 
Latin American democratization may have serious implications for the contemporary 
representation of women, as Latin America (with the exception of its two oldest democracies, 
Costa Rica and Venezuela) has an historically weak democratic culture (Chant and Craske, 2003; 
Lyn, 1997; Rule, 1981, 1994). For instance, in countries dominated by corporatism and populism 
(such as Bolivia, Brazil, Mexico, and Peru), the regimes take an organic view of society where 
the natural order is gendered and racialized (Chant and Craske, 2003). Given the corporate 
identities central to this state form, gender and ethnic identities are delineated and certain gender 
relations, particularly paternalism, are reinforced. As such, the designated role for women is 
primarily to support their male leaders (Chant and Craske, 2003). However, compared to other 
regime types, corporatism only constrains the scope of women‟s participation in a limited 
fashion and women are actually allowed access to decision-making arenas through officially 
sanctioned political space (Chant and Craske, 20003; Craske, 1999).  
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 In contrast, party systems, like those that were found in Chile, Uruguay, Venezuela, and 
Colombia, generally experience lower levels of female representation than their corporatist 
neighbors (Craske, 1999). As these systems arise, they center on an elite-dominated power 
structure, in which women are enfranchised in far fewer numbers. In particular, there are very 
few female congressional representatives or executive office holders in party dominated political 
systems (Craske, 1999). Thus, countries later searching for better pathways to female 
representation may find themselves hindered by this legacy (Chant and Craske, 2003; Schwindt-
Bayer, 2006, 2010). 
 Even more detrimental to women‟s representation are the abundant military regimes 
found throughout Latin America‟s history (Chant and Craske, 2003; Craske, 1999; Lyn, 1997). 
The list of military regimes is long, as seven countries suffered military coups just between the 
1960s and 1970s. The Latin American countries affected by this final dominance of military or 
military-supported dictatorships includes Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Peru, 
Uruguay, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama and 
Paraguay. Although not all countries engage in state terror to the same degree, autonomous civil 
society is demobilized and repressed. Paradoxically, it is during this period that women became 
more politically active through grassroots social movements. Thus, women‟s ultimate path to 
achieving increased political power partially lies in the very governments that sought to silence 
their citizens through any means possible (Craske, 1999; Lyn, 1997; Schwindt-Bayer, 2010).   
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Women and Democratization in Latin America 
 As the Third Wave of Democratization breaks the silence of these most repressive of 
Latin American regimes, the influence of women‟s movements comes to major scholars‟ 
attention (Lyn, 1997). Most notably, Temma Kaplan (1990) explains the rise of groups such as 
the “mothers of the disappeared” whose legitimacy is based on women‟s traditional roles within 
the family. Discussing the emergence of the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo in Argentina, for 
example, Maria del Carmen Feijoo writes: 
The creation of certain rules of the game incorporated a feminine logic based on respect 
for the traditional role of women, who are thought to be altruistic and vicarious…In 
practice, the Madres became another movement of women who, without trying to change 
patriarchal ideology or abandon their femininity, produced a transformation of the 
traditional feminine conscience and its political role. The task of defending life itself was 
forced out of the private sphere of the household and into the autonomous space of public 
and political discussion (1989: 778).  
 
Women begin to challenge what they see as unfair government practices but, as described above, 
they do so through a decidedly „feminine‟ lens. Their movements focus on goals that are often 
seen as female in nature such as projects to recover missing family members, to protect children, 
or to end domestic violence (Kaplan, 1990). This is not particularly threatening to the male 
psyche and does not infringe upon many of the more „masculine‟ agendas party leaders and 
objectors are focused upon (del Carmen Feijoo, 1989; Kaplan, 1990). The successes of women‟s 
grassroots movements in Latin America may be owed to this very fact.  
Researchers cite further evidence of women‟s grassroots coalitions successfully securing 
rights historically unavailable to female citizens (Celis and Childs, 2008; Studlar and McAllister, 
2002: Mackay, 2008; Taylor-Robinson and Heath, 2003). For example in Uruguay, the campaign 
against domestic violence culminated in The Working Group on Women‟s Status. This was a 
“coordinating body of female representatives from all political parties and women‟s social 
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organizations who fought to be successfully included in the National Consensus-Building Forum 
(CONAPRO)” (Johnson, 2002:103). This movement coincides with Uruguay‟s early decision to 
cede legislated rights to women. A second example may be found in Brazil where the Feminist 
Research and Advisory Center (Centro Feminista de Estudos e Assessoria: CAFEMEA) is a 
national women‟s NGO aimed at improving the literacy of Brazilian women and decreasing the 
de jure stronghold of men over local politics (Macaulay, 2000). Thus, women in Latin America 
have left a specific legacy on the region‟s democratization. They have risen through the ranks 
and gained unprecedented access to government through grassroots pressure with a decidedly 
„feminine‟ agenda (del Carmen Feijoo, 1989; Johnson, 2002; Kaplan, 1990). This historical 
context may factor into the interpretation of levels of SRW in relation to the social and political 
opportunities increasingly afforded women in the region. 
Women, Constitutions, and Civil Codes in Latin America 
 As Latin America has democratized, women‟s unique, grassroots influence on the 
process is often constitutionally solidified. Because constitutions define the relationship between 
the state and its citizens, it is within these written bodies that the states‟ responsibilities are 
defined and the limits of its powers are addressed (Chant and Craske, 2003). Most constitutions 
in Latin America now declare equal rights for both men and women. However, Chile‟s 
constitution states that, “Men are born free and equal in rights and dignity” (Article 1) with no 
mention of „women‟ as a specific or separate category. Bolivia‟s constitution also gives a special 
place to the family in Article 193 stating that, “Matrimony, the family and maternity are under 
the protection of the state.” In Chile, Article II similarly states that “the family is the fundamental 
nucleus of society…,” and many such other pronouncements are made in the constitutions of 
Ecuador (Article 37), Nicaragua (Article 70), Paraguay (Article 49) and Uruguay (Article 40), 
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though this is by no means an exhaustive list. Article 19 of Chile‟s constitution has a particular 
impact on women since it declares that, “the law protects the life of those about to be born” (La 
ley protégé la vida del que esta por nacer). This makes abortion for Chilean women not merely 
illegal but unconstitutional. These examples highlight the stark realities Latin American women 
face. While the region is now dominated by presidential democracies, rights are constitutionally 
afforded to women on paper, and the distinct contribution to the democratization process 
attributed to female movements is recognized, the legacies of cultural patriarchy, colonialism, 
and non-democratic regimes have constrained the political and social progress of women 
throughout the region (Chant and Craske, 2003; Jaquette and Pescatello, 1973; Jaquette and 
Wolchik, 1998). 
 If the constitutions of Latin America are not particularly favorable to women‟s 
advancement, the civil codes are even less affirmative (Chant and Craske, 2003). Many of these 
date back to the nineteenth century and reflect the Napoleonic legal system that was introduced 
across the region after it gained independence (Chant and Craske, 2003). In regimes during this 
period, women were treated as minors. As Molyneux and Dore (2000) explains: 
They had virtually no rights in the family: if employed, they were required to hand over 
their earnings to their husbands and enjoyed no automatic rights to marital property. They 
were not allowed to testify in court or hold public office, and they enjoyed no authority 
over or claim to their children under the rulings of the patria potestad. Women were 
regarded as lacking in rationality, as too weak and impulsive to be treated as the equals of 
men. They were therefore regarded as „outside citizenship‟ and as such were in need of 
protection, like children (43).  
Unfortunately, much of this patrimony continues. Many countries limit women in their choice of 
paid labor, generally citing this decision on the grounds of it being prejudicial to women‟s 
domestic role (Craske, 1999). For example, Article 110 of the Guatemalan civil code addresses 
the responsibilities within marriage, conferring upon the wife the „special right and obligation‟ to 
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care for dependent children in the home (Chant and Craske, 2003). Furthermore, Article 113 
provides that, “…a married woman may only exercise a profession or maintain employment 
where this does not prejudice her role as mother and homemaker” (Steiner et al., 1996: 890). 
Venezuela also codifies gender disparities into its regulation of commercial transactions. Women 
are only allowed to pledge conjugal property with the husband‟s consent, whereas men can pledge 
such property freely, without the consent of his wife (Steiner et al., 1996). In Nicaragua, women 
are, “…required to accept the husbands‟ domicile on marriage” (Steiner et al., 1996: 893).  
 The above examples demonstrate the lack of formal legal power afforded Latin American 
women which, despite being antiquated, continue to govern female citizens as distinct from their 
male counterparts (Craske, 1999). Thus, although much has changed since the days of pre-
Columbian society, in many ways things for women have very much stayed the same (Chant and 
Craske, 2003; Schwindt-Bayer, 2010; Vincent, 2004). Legal language continues to favor male 
leadership over female participation and the prevailing view of women as mothers and wives still 
dominates society (Chant and Craske, 2003; Craske, 1999). These facts stand in stark contrast to 
the levels of political and social participation indicated by public opinion polls.  
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Table 3 
Latinobarometer Responses to Q57B 2009 
Cultural Attitudes Toward Female Politicians 
  
Percent Agreed 
"Men are Better 
Leaders than 
Women 
Level of Women's 
Representation (Low, 
Medium, High) 
Dominican Republic 49.2 Medium 
  
 
  
Guatemala 38.0 Low 
  
 
  
Honduras 37.9 High 
  
 
  
Panama 36.2 Medium 
  
 
  
Nicaragua 35.2 Medium 
  
 
  
Venezuela 34.1 Medium 
  
 
  
Paraguay 33.8 Low 
  
 
  
Ecuador 33.6 Medium 
  
 
  
Brazil 32.4 Low 
  
 
  
Bolivia 29.5 Medium 
  
 
  
El Salvador 27.8 Medium 
  
 
  
Colombia 26.5 Low 
  
 
  
Chile 25.9 Medium 
  
 
  
Argentina 24.9 High 
  
 
  
Costa Rica 20.9 High 
  
 
  
Peru 18.5 High 
  
 
  
Uruguay 16.7 Low 
  
 
  
Mexico 16.0 High 
Source: Latinobarometer, 2009 
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Table 4 
Political and Social Indicators 
for Latin American Women 
Source: World Bank Gender Statistics 
 
 
 
 
Proportion of Women  
Women % of Labor Force 
in Ministerial Level Positions (%) 
  2005 2010 1990 2000 2010 
Argentina 8.3 20 36.1 38.1 40.2 
Bolivia 6.7 20 39 43.2 44.8 
Brazil 7.1 11.4 35 41.2 43.7 
Chile 16.7 45.5 30.5 33.1 39.6 
Colombia 21.4 35.7 30 38.7 42.5 
Costa Rica 25 35 27.6 30.8 36.2 
Dominican Republic 8.7 14.3 34 36.6 39.4 
Ecuador 14.3 32.5 31.9 37.4 39.7 
El Salvador 15.4 35.5 35.4 39.6 41.4 
Guatemala 25 0 31.6 34.6 38.1 
Honduras 14.3 35.7 28.1 34.1 34.1 
Mexico 9.4 10.5 29.9 32.9 36.5 
Nicaragua 14.3 38.5 30.3 32.5 37.9 
Panama 14.3 26.7 32.7 35.4 37.3 
Paraguay 30.8 21.7 36.7 36.6 39.7 
Uruguay 0 21.4 39 43.2 44.5 
Venezuela 13.6 25.9 31.5 37.2 39.3 
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4. CONCLUSION 
What is the puzzle? 
 The information above provides researchers with an interesting puzzle. Have higher 
numbers of women in Latin American legislatures improved the lives of women in Latin 
America? There is some evidence to indicate an overall improvement in the participation of 
women in government and in society. However, it is still unclear as to whether or not this 
increased participation has benefitted women in terms of substantive representation. The current 
literature is dominated by studies that link DRW to SRW in Western, industrialized nations. 
There are three institutional explanations that researchers deem to be important if we wish to 
solve the proposed puzzle. The electoral rules of a country, the party organization of a country, 
and the existence of quota laws within a country are widely accepted as the most important 
institutional contexts (Dahlerup, 2006; Carey and Shugart, 1995; Taagepera and Shugart, 1989; 
Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler, 2005; Shwindt-Bayer, 2010). Cultural factors, such as religion and 
levels of democracy, and socioeconomic factors, such as GDP per capita, are also cited as 
important explanatory factors (Schwindt-Bayer, 2010).  
 The scholarly contribution of this paper lies in its adaptation of the theories which argue 
that the structure of electoral institutions, the structure of party institutions, and the adoption of 
quota laws affect SRW and applies them to studies of developing, rather than in developed, 
countries. Because women are half of the world‟s population it is important that we not only 
understand their representation in Western democracies but that we understand their 
representation, or lack thereof, in nascent democratic states (Jaquette and Wolchik, 1998; Mill, 
1989). A clearer understanding of the pathways to improved substantive representation, or an 
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understanding of obstacles to improved substantive representation, may allow us to make policy 
recommendations to leaders looking to improve the lives of their people and to deepen 
democracy (Mill, 1989; Norris and Franklin, 1997; Young, 2002). 
 This project also uses a larger sample size (N=18) and a longer time span (20 years) than 
others of its kind, allowing for more comparison and, ideally, generalizability. Furthermore, the 
empirical methods used for the quantitative analyses in the following chapters are chosen 
specifically to deal with the problems inherent to panel data and the assumptions that must be 
made to interpret the results. The decision to focus on Latin America in particular is derived 
from several significant factors. The variation in institutional arrangements makes it a useful 
region for testing the proposed theories. Latin America also varies widely on levels of women‟s 
descriptive and substantive representation, on district sizes, and on electoral rules. Furthermore, 
there are countries both with and without quota laws. Lastly, there is observable variation in 
socioeconomics and the region is dominated by a single religion: Catholicism (Schwindt-Bayer, 
2010). From a normative standpoint, these advantages to studying SRW in Latin America will 
allow comparative political scientists to build upon a set of findings that can inform analyses in 
other developing regions or possibly in countries with similar institutional or cultural 
characteristics, regardless of development levels. 
 Moreover, it is important to continue to improve upon our understanding of women‟s 
representation so that we may identify and eliminate the primary obstacle(s) to power that 
women face in contemporary legislatures. The underrepresentation of women in the male-
dominated legislatures of Latin America must be addressed so that women may turn their 
political preferences into legislative action (Schwindt-Bayer, 2010). Multiple researchers point to 
the institutional constraints that legislatures pose for female legislators, emphasizing that 
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electoral rules, political parties, and quota laws may reinforce a gendered institution that 
prioritizes the masculine over the feminine, thus creating incongruity between levels of DRW 
and levels of SRW (Duerst-Lahti and Verstegen, 1995; Franceschet and Piscopo, 2008; Htun and 
Mackay, 2008; Power, 2006; Rosenthal, 1997, 1998; Schwindt-Bayer, 2010; Vincent, 2004; 
Zetterberg, 2008).  
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. The next chapter, Chapter 3, is 
the first of the empirical chapters and focuses on explicating the importance of electoral 
institutions in Latin American states for SRW. For instance, it is theorized that factors such as 
the adoption of proportional representation (PR) or single member districts (SMD) may affect 
women‟s substantive representation (Matland and Studlar, 1996). It is also theorized that district 
magnitude, the incentive to cultivate a personal vote, and the use of open or closed lists may 
significantly affect SRW (Carey and Shugart, 1995; Engstrom, 1987; Welsh and Studlar, 1990). 
These, and other, major theories of women‟s representation and electoral institutions are 
presented. The pertinent variables and hypotheses are presented to the reader, with specific 
attention paid to the adoption of variables that are both traditionally, and non-traditionally, used 
in the literature. This includes the use of variables from the Cingranelli and Richards (2010) data 
set, which are relatively new to arguments of women‟s representation. Control variables are also 
introduced in order to account for SES and levels of democracy. Analyses of each hypothesis are 
conducted, using statistical methods appropriate to comparative political science. Special 
attention is paid to the use of imputed data sets in order to account for the large amount of 
missing data reported on some of the independent variable measures. The specified regressions 
are run and the results are both quantitatively and qualitatively analyzed. A discussion of these 
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results is undertaken and followed by a conclusion that presents the broader implications of these 
findings on the importance of electoral institutions for women‟s representation. 
The second empirical chapter, Chapter 4, focuses specifically on the theoretical link(s) 
between party institutions and SRW in Latin America. Of the most importance are the variables 
that measure levels of party power centralization in Latin American countries, as it is theorized 
that higher levels of party power concentration may negatively affect women‟s substantive 
representation (Caul, 1999). Namely, the control party elites wield over the „rules of the game‟ 
may have a greater or lesser effect on the ability of women to enter the political arena in a 
meaningful way (Costa Benavides, 2003; Kaiser, 2001). However, the majority of studies in this 
field have mainly compared outcomes produced by various party institutions by measuring levels 
of DRW, not SRW (Beckwith, 2002; Celis and Childs, 2008; Celis et al., 2008). Thus we only 
have a minimal understanding of how party institutions work to elect women, not how they 
contribute to women‟s substantive representation. In line with the rest of the dissertation, this 
chapter works to add to our knowledge on the subject of SRW by using comparative methods 
and quantitative data, drawing variables, hypotheses and methodology from previous scholarly 
studies. A discussion of the results of the empirical analyses precedes a conclusion which 
outlines the contribution of Chapter 4‟s findings to the literature more broadly. 
Chapter 5 is the final empirical chapter and examines the possible effects of quota laws 
on women‟s substantive representation. Quota Laws are the third category of institutions that are 
most often studied in relation to women‟s substantive representation. The introduction of quota 
laws occurred mostly in the early 1990s, with Argentina being one of the first Latin American 
countries to undertake a program of quota initiation (Franceschet and Piscopo, 2008; Gray, 
2003). The introduction of these laws rests upon the assumption that DRW is directly and 
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positively related to SRW (Araujo and Garcia, 2006; Dahlerup, 2006; Franceschet and Piscopo, 
2008; Jones, 2009; Kittilson, 2005; Mansbridge, 2005; Schmidt and Saunders, 2004). We should, 
then, be able to find a simple empirical connection between the adoption of quota laws and 
resultant SRW. However, what researchers have found is that as the form and location of quota 
systems differ, the impact of these laws varies widely (Tripp and Kang, 2008; Vincent, 2004; 
Xydias, 2007, 2010). As a result, I draw hypotheses from extant literature and empirically test 
them using the data from Latin America. A discussion of the results and their link to current 
theories is presented, followed by a conclusion which places the findings in the context of the 
wider literature and provides an explanation of their implication for scholarly research in this 
area. 
The conclusion of this dissertation connects the findings of the three empirical chapters to 
the broader theories regarding women‟s substantive representation in Latin America and beyond. 
The hope is to provide a greater understanding of the connection between electoral institutions, 
party institutions, quota laws and the relationship between DRW and SRW. Identifying 
roadblocks to improved SRW in Latin America is important for the region‟s democratic, 
economic and social growth (Mill, 1989). A thorough theoretical discussion of the cultural 
atmosphere and the possible effects of the marginalization of women in Latin American 
parliaments is provided. Issues with data which may affect the findings of the dissertation, such 
as an insufficient passage of time, are addressed. Finally, the implications of the findings of the 
dissertation are discussed, especially as they relate to improving extant literature on the topic. 
 
 
 36 
CHAPTER III: ELECTORAL INSTITUTIONS AND WOMEN‟S SUBSTANTIVE 
REPRESENTATION IN LATIN AMERICA 
  
1. INTRODUCTION 
An important question spawned by this dissertation‟s overarching puzzle is does a 
country‟s electoral environment affect women‟s substantive representation. More specifically, 
does a more permissive electoral environment allow for better SRW in Latin America? While it 
is clear that increasing the number of women in Latin American parliaments is important for a 
number of reasons, such as improving the health of democracy and creating new economic 
opportunities (Htun and Jones, 2002; Richards and Gelleny, 2007; Skard and Haavio-Mannila, 
1985), it is not clear that this is sufficient to substantively improve women‟s lives (Beckwith, 
2002; Beckwith and Cowell-Meyers, 2003). The complicated relationship between DRW and 
SRW is emphasized in the previous chapter. We presently turn to a study of the electoral 
institutions, and the possible interactions between these institutions, that may or may not affect 
this relationship. Starting with an analysis of the electoral institutions of Latin America is 
justified by three main points: they are highly visible, they are very commonly codified, and they 
are extensively studied in democratic countries across many regions, not just Central and South 
America (Celis and Childs, 2008; Celis et al., 2008; Engstrom, 1987; Jones, 2009; Kaiser, 2001).  
The focus of this chapter is placed upon three key electoral institutions as they relate to 
SRW in Latin America. These are the incentive to cultivate a personal vote, the effective vote 
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threshold, and the level of legislative fractionalization. The basis for including these variables 
lies in their presence in prominent studies of DRW and SRW both in Latin America and in 
Western developed democracies (see: Carey and Shugart, 1995; Mackay, 2008; Neto and Cox, 
1997; Taagepera and Shugart, 1989; Tsbelis, 2011; Weldon, 2002). Although there are other 
variables which have been widely used in similar studies, such as district magnitude (M), open 
versus closed ballot, and the number of veto players, the following analyses are simplified in 
order to decrease the noisiness of the models in an attempt to more directly pinpoint the affect of 
x on y.  
2. VARIABLES AND HYPOTHESES 
 A. DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
To contribute to the understanding of the relationship between electoral institutions, DRW, 
and SRW, cross-sectional time series data (panel data) are used across 18 countries of Latin 
America between 1990 and 2010. For the purposes of this project, multiple dependent variables 
are used. As highlighted in Chapter II, past studies of SRW in Latin America have measured 
SRW with dependent variables such as quality of health care, educational attainment, literacy, 
life expectancy, and unemployment rates (Celis and Childs, 2008; Childs, 2003; Mackay, 2008). 
However, it is argued that these variables are flawed due to the incomplete reporting of 
observations in developing nations (Celis et al., 2008; Schwindt-Bayer, 2010; Xydias, 2010). 
Also, researchers often justify the adoption of these indicators in studies of Latin America based 
on their use in studies of SRW in Western, developed nations. But generalizing the use of 
variables shown to be efficacious in studies of developed countries to studies of LDCs hinders 
the researcher‟s ability to analyze, and interpret the results of data-driven hypotheses (Celis et 
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al., 2008; Schwindt-Bayer, 2010; Xydias, 2010). The largest problems cited for quantitative 
analyses using such measures in studies of LDCs are 1) a host of missing data on these 
„traditional‟ variables; at times almost half of the data is unreported/missing and 2) cross-
national comparison is often difficult as much of the data are not collected using the same 
metrics in developed countries versus LDCs (Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler, 2005; Schwindt-
Bayer, 2010). Thus, in order to make a scholarly contribution to the literature, it is important that 
this study uses data that are appropriate for the Latin American context with the hope that the 
findings may ultimately be used to inform studies of SRW in other developing regions.  
To this end, this dissertation uses three separate, but related indices, which measure women‟s 
substantive representation and are drawn from the United Nations Human Development Report 
(2011). These indices are gaining popularity and are used in similar studies of representation 
over the last decade (Cueva Betteta, 2006; Devlin and Elgie, 2008; Vincent, 2004). The purpose 
of using these indices is to test their value added in comparison to the more traditional measures, 
which, as mentioned above, tend to be problematic (Cueva Betteta, 2006; Schwindt-Bayer, 
2010). These variables, developed by the United Nations Development Programme, appear in 
their most complete form in the Cingranelli and Richards (2010) human rights dataset. The three 
indices are more completely reported across the years studied than the traditional social and 
economic indicators listed above. They are termed 1) Women‟s Social Rights 2) Women‟s 
Economic Rights and 3) Women‟s Political Rights. According to Wagnerud (2005), 
In their measuring of women‟s rights Cingranelli and Richards are interested in two 
things: one, the extensiveness of laws pertaining to women‟s rights; and two, government 
practices towards women. The scales run from (0) which means that there are no rights 
for women under law (systematic discrimination based on sex may even be built into the 
law) and the government tolerates a high level of discrimination against women, to (3) 
which means that all or nearly all rights are guaranteed by law and, in practice, the 
government tolerates none or almost no discrimination against women” (10-11). 
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In further support of the use of Cingranelli and Richards‟ variables, Paxton and Hughes (2007) 
descriptively shows the positive and significant relationship between one of these indices 
(Women‟s Political Rights) and a country‟s ratification of CEDAW (the Committee on The 
Elimination of Discrimination against Women). Those countries that ratify CEDAW measure 
higher on the index of women‟s political rights, hinting at a preliminary connection between 
women-specific legislation and women‟s substantive representation. 
A second important work, by Richards and Gelleny (2007), reinforces the usefulness of 
the Women‟s Political Rights variable in their examination of the connection between legislation 
and SRW across developing countries. The longstanding concept of „women‟s status‟ in social 
science literature, according to the authors, refers to the condition of women „vis-à-vis‟ some 
“collection of rights and duties”. These rights and duties, from a human rights perspective, 
“would be the body of international law containing gender-specific protections and assurances. 
This would include, most prominently, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women (1979)” (Richards and Gelleny, 2007: 859). The preliminary 
results of Paxton and Hughes‟ descriptive analysis show that the Cingranelli and Richards 
variable “Women‟s Political Rights” follows the social science tradition of being evaluated vis-à-
vis some collection of rights and duties. The relationship manifests as theoretically expected: 
over time, countries that ratify CEDAW minimize domestic levels of political inequity between 
men and women (Richards and Gelleny, 2007). These examples provide at least preliminary 
evidence of the efficacy of Cingrelli and Richards‟ variables in the study of SRW. 
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Figure 4 Women’s Average Political Equality in 123 Countries, 1981-2003 
 
 
 
    
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
      
Furthermore, Bochsler and Hug (2009) employ these indexed variables in a game-
theoretic study of minority representation under referendum. In this cross-national work, the two 
remaining indices (Women‟s Social Rights and Women‟s Economic Rights) are evaluated as 
proxies for policy outcomes in the authors‟ models. In relation to the variables of interest, the 
authors find that: 
Women‟s social and economic rights are negatively correlated with a traditional 
view on women‟s role in society. The more respondents reject the statement that 
being a housewife is just as fulfilling as working for pay, the more women‟s 
social rights are developed (2009: 12). 
 
This provides further evidence suggesting that the CIRI  indices approximate the actual amount 
of rights afforded women in society, as the relationship is significant and in the expected 
direction (the more liberal a society, the more rights women enjoy) across several different types 
of methodological studies. In sum, there is evidence that the Cingranelli and Richards indices 
serve as reasonable proxies for levels of women‟s substantive representation (SRW). However, 
the efficiency and validity of these indices has yet to be fully determined as there is no evidence 
of internal consistency provided by Cingranelli and Richards, such as an Alpha Score or a 
conclusive factor analysis. What each index does provide is a multi-dimensional measure of a 
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multi-dimensional concept with annual coverage. Thus far, no other similar variables are able to 
provide researchers with this advantage.  This dissertation, which is intended to be a more 
complete study of the relationship between SRW and political institutions in Latin America than 
what has been produced in the past, serves as a platform to further evaluate the usefulness of 
these variables as indicators of women‟s substantive representation.  
To establish their efficacy, it is important to include the exact parameters by which each of 
Cingranelli and Richards‟ indices is evaluated. The variable, Women‟s Economic Rights 
(ciri_wecon), primarily focuses on the extensiveness of laws pertaining to women‟s social rights 
and on government practices towards women, or how effectively the government enforces the 
law (Cingranelli and Richards, 1999: 37). The following scores reflect these two major tenants: 
(0) There are no economic rights for women under law and systematic 
discrimination based on sex may be built into the law. The government tolerates 
a high level of discrimination against women. 
(1) There are some economic rights for women under law. However, in practice, the 
government DOES NOT enforce the laws effectively or enforcement of laws is 
weak. The government tolerates a moderate level of discrimination against 
women. 
(2) There are some economic rights for women under law. In practice, the 
government DOES enforce these laws effectively. However, the government 
still tolerates a low level of discrimination against women. 
(3) All or nearly all of women‟s economic rights are guaranteed by law. In practice, 
the government fully and vigorously enforces these laws. The government 
tolerates none or almost no discrimination against women (Cingranelli and 
Richards, 1999).  
Women‟s Social Rights (ciri_wosoc) is based on the same components and is measured with the 
same rubric used to measure women‟s economic rights: 
(0) There are no social rights for women under law and systematic discrimination 
based on sex may be built into the law. The government tolerates a high level of 
discrimination against women. 
(1) There are some social rights for women under law. However, in practice, the 
government DOES NOT enforce the laws effectively or enforcement of laws is 
weak. The government tolerates a moderate level of discrimination against 
women. 
(2) There are some social rights for women under law. In practice, the government 
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DOES enforce these laws effectively. However, the government still tolerates a 
low level of discrimination against women. 
(3) All or nearly all of women‟s social rights are guaranteed by law. In practice, the 
government fully and vigorously enforces these laws. The government tolerates 
none or almost no discrimination against women (Cingranelli and Richards, 1999).  
Lastly, Women‟s Political Rights (ciri_wopol) is similarly measured but has specific thresholds 
built into the rubric for measurement:   
(0) None of women‟s political rights are guaranteed by law. There are laws that 
completely restrict the participation of women in the political process. 
(1) Political equality is guaranteed by law. However, there are significant limitations 
in practice. Women hold less than five percent of seats in the national legislature 
and in other high-ranking government positions. 
(2) Political equality is guaranteed by law. Women hold more than five percent but 
less than thirty percent of seats in the national legislature and/or in other highranking 
government positions. 
(3) Political equality is guaranteed by law and in practice. Women hold more than 
thirty percent of seats in the national legislature and/or in other high-ranking 
government positions (Cingranelli and Richards, 1999). 
 Alongside the use of the CIRI variables, three dependent variables traditionally found in 
the SRW literature are used. These include 1) a measure of women‟s fertility rates, 2) women‟s 
percent enrollment in secondary education (as compared to the percent of men enrolled), and 3) 
the percentage of women in the formal labor force. These variables are included so that the 
results obtained using the CIRI variables may be compared to those produced by the traditional 
measures. If it is found that the CIRI indices produce significant and reliable results across all 
three of the empirical chapters, further support may be given to the usefulness of such indicators 
in studies of SRW in developing nations. However, it is important to include a sampling of 
traditional measures as they have shown to be relatively reliable predictors of SRW in past 
studies of Western, industrialized nations (Bystydzienski, 1992; Duerst-Lahti, 2005; Gurin and 
Townsend, 1986; Kaiser, 2001; Lovenduski and Norris, 2004; Matland, 1993; Matland and 
Taylor, 1997). Each of the traditional variables is a continuous indicator, believed to show the 
relative standing of women within a given society.  
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B. INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
Incentive for Personal Campaigns 
There is significant debate about the proper realm in which researchers should examine 
the incentive for candidates to cultivate a personal vote. Some researchers posit that the party 
structures, rather than the electoral structures, of voting systems are the true institutions 
controlling electoral behavior. However, many other researchers argue that these incentives are 
created through both electoral structures as well as party system structures (Ansolabehere et al., 
2001; Caul, 1999; Carey and Shugart, 1995; Jones, 2009; Lijphart, 1994, 2012). These 
researchers also point out that the incentive to cultivate a personal vote primarily arises with a 
country‟s electoral institutions but may spill over into party institutions to create secondary 
pressure on candidates (Lijphart, 1994, 2012). Consequently, to ensure theoretical pragmatism 
and to avoid modeling uncontrolled, reciprocal relationships, the incentive to cultivate a personal 
campaign is only considered in this chapter, dealing with electoral institutions.  
Regardless of scholarly disagreement surrounding the proper „realm‟ for a discussion of 
personal campaigning, it is a key variable that may contribute to varying levels of SRW. 
Theoretically, it is often unlikely that the overarching platforms of large, established parties 
include a host of issues specific to women (Caul, 1999; Jones, 2009). Women may feel the need 
to defect from the party‟s reputation, depending upon the particular electoral rules governing 
elections, in order to stake a claim for herself outside of the status quo platform (Carroll, 2001; 
Caul, 1999; Jones, 2002). This is problematic as it is often difficult for Latin American women to 
develop social networks and garner the personal or business experience necessary to enter office 
(Langston and Aparicio, 2012). The work of Langston and Aparicio (2012) on the systems of 
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Mexico, shows that women have encountered significant barriers to obtaining office through 
exclusion from public, not just political, roles in society. The lack of opportunity for personal 
advancement and networking outside of legislative chambers may be strongly detrimental to 
electoral success (Frechette et al., 2008; Langston and Aparicio, 2012). This adds to the more 
common explanations of male incumbency and voter bias, which claim to explain lower success 
rates for female political competitors (Freschette et al., 2008).  Thus, the logic for including 
the incentive to cultivate a personal vote within a discussion of SRW is its potential to alienate 
women either from possible voters or from co-partisans (Frechette et al., 2008).  
 While the incentive to cultivate a personal vote exists far less often in PR systems than in 
SMD systems, there is still the possibility of this cultivation under specific types of PR electoral 
rules. Most studies have approached electoral institutions to evaluate their effects on allocating 
seats to parties, as this may have a large effect on proportionality (Lijphart, 1994; Shugart and 
Carey, 1995; Taagepera and Shugart, 1989). Because women in Latin America are relatively 
underrepresented, proportionality is an important link to understanding to the overall level of 
SRW. This is especially relevant because electoral formulas do not just allocate seats to parties 
but they must also allocate seats to specific candidates within parties (Shugart and Carey, 1995). 
The authors best sum this point stating that, 
How electoral formulas distribute a precious commodity, legislative seats, among the many 
candidates or prospective candidates seeking the commodity affects the extent to which 
individual politicians can benefit by developing personal reputations distinct from those of their 
party (Shugart and Carey, 1995:417). 
Thus, the authors develop a method for estimating the relative value to legislators and legislative 
hopefuls, of personal versus party reputations for advancing political careers. Carey and 
Shugart‟s model is based on four variables, which they deem common to all electoral systems: 
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ballot control, vote pooling, type of votes, and district magnitude (1995). A variable called 
„Personalistic Tier‟ is created, which takes into account each of these components of electoral 
systems, and calculates the amount of incentive to cultivate a personalistic vote at the most 
populous tier (tier with the greatest number of legislators, which works well with this study, as it 
is only focused on the lower house, or single house if a country is unicameral, which always 
includes a larger number of legislators than do higher level chambers of legislatures). This 
variable takes into account the following: 
1. BALLOT Scored: 
 
0: leaders present a fixed ballot, voters may not „disturb‟ list; 
1: leaders present party ballots, but voter may „disturb‟ list; 
2: leaders do not control access to ballots, or rank. 
When Ballot equals 0, leaders have maximum control over ballots, voters choose among parties 
rather than individual candidates, and so the value of personal reputations is minimized. A score 
of one indicates that leaders control which politicians secure the party‟s endorsement, but voters 
can determine which candidates are elected by selecting from among the candidates presented by 
the party. This necessarily implies competition among candidates who share the same party 
label, and so indicates that personal reputation will be valuable. A score of 2 means that party 
leaders are marginalized, and the value of personal reputation is maximized.  
2. POOL scored: 
0: Pooling across whole party; 
1: pooling at sub-party level; 
2: no pooling 
The same logic used to interpret ballot score is also used to interpret the pooling score.  
3. VOTE scored: 
0: Voters cast a single vote for one party; 
1: Voters cast votes for multiple candidates; 
2: voters cast a single vote below the party level 
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The same logic used to interpret ballot and pool score is also applied to the interpretation of vote 
score.  
The variable ranks countries in increasing order of incentive to cultivate a personalistic 
vote, varying from values of 1 to 13, corresponding to Carey and Shugart‟s thirteen positions in 
their 1995 ranking. Thus a country with a ranking of 1 would have a tier with the lowest possible 
rank of personal vote incentive and a country with a ranking of 13 would have a tier with the 
highest possible incentive to cultivate a personal vote. The true importance of this variable lies in 
the tension it creates between personal and party reputation. Again, it creates a potential conflict 
between individual politicians and district-level party leaders. For women‟s representation, this 
could prove to be disastrous. The logic here springs from the tendency for women to run in 
larger, more well-established parties (Matland and Taylor, 1997; Miguel, 2008; Paxton and 
Hughes, 2007). Thus: 
H1: As the incentive for personal campaigning increases, SRW decreases 
Legislative Fractionalization 
A second institutional factor which may greatly affect SRW in Latin America is the 
amount of fractionalization found within a given legislature or legislative fractionalization (Caul, 
1999; Lijphart, 1994; Tremblay, 2008). The variable used here is taken from the Henisz Political 
Constraints Index (POLCON) and is approximately the probability that two random draws from 
the lower legislative chamber will be from different parties (Henisz, 2002). The inclusion of this 
variable is also justified by arguments of proportionality (Tremblay, 2008). While 
proportionality most often refers to the ability of an electoral system to closely represent its 
constituent members, it can similarly be applied to the ability of parties to mirror the constituent 
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makeup within the legislature (Schwindt-Bayer, 2010). As compared to men, women make up a 
very small portion of the overall number of parliamentarians/legislators in Latin America, 
making them a minority within legislative chambers. Because Latin American political parties 
have high levels of disproportionality, Latin American parliaments have high levels of 
disproportionality (United Nations Gender Statistics, 2007).  
The importance of disproportionality lies in its exacerbation of the effects of legislative 
fractionalization in respect to SRW. Because women are underrepresented in legislatures, high 
levels of legislative fractionalization may make it difficult for women to gain support for 
initiatives designed specifically to tackle issues of women‟s representation.7 It follows that the 
problem with high levels of fractionalization is the inability of female legislators to create either 
1) the coalition(s) necessary to have their policy preferences carried out or 2) enough support 
within their own party to have their policy initiatives supported (Chattopadhyay and Duflo, 2004; 
Schwindt-Bayer, 2010). Thus: 
H2: As legislative fractionalization increases, SRW decreases. 
Vote Threshold 
 The final key electoral institution in this dissertation is the vote threshold (also referred to 
as the election threshold). Election thresholds stipulate that a party must receive a minimum 
percentage of votes to obtain any seats in parliament (Jones and Mainwaring, 2003). This means 
that small parties which fail to meet the set threshold will not obtain any legislative seats. The 
indication is that smaller, or minor, parties may be effectively disenfranchised and denied the 
right of representation (Jones and Mainwaring, 2003). The higher the vote threshold required for 
                                                          
7
 As set up in previous chapters, women have different policy preferences and voting records than do men, in 
general. For more information please see: Bratton, 2005; Carroll, 2001; Poggione, 2004; Saint-Germain, 1989.  
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representation in a legislature, the more restrictive the electoral institutions are considered to be 
(Taagepera and Shugart, 1989; Cox, 1997). Typically, it is thought, women do better in more 
permissive electoral environments, as smaller groups have a better chance of gaining legislative 
representation, giving women a voice in the legislature (Taagepera and Shugart, 1989). This is 
especially important within the context of Latin America as it is believed that Catholicism and 
patriarchal political systems dominate the existence of Latin American political parties (Craske, 
1999). The implication is that while multiple parties exist along the partisan spectrum, most are 
often predominantly conservative. Latin American conservatism regularly precludes the active 
participation of women in governmental affairs. In sum, vote thresholds are used to proxy the 
permissiveness of the electoral environment within the overarching context of conservatism. The 
more permissive is the environment, the more likely it is that women are afforded rights in 
society. Accordingly, it is expected that: 
H3: As vote threshold increases, SRW decreases. 
C. CONTROL VARIABLES 
 There are several further factors which must be introduced to this study as control 
variables. First, and because so much of the literature points to the number of women in the 
legislature as the main explanation for levels of SRW, the number of women in parliament must 
be included in this analysis.
8
 Conventional wisdom draws a direct causal arrow from DRW to 
SRW. If this is true, we should find that, when controlling for the number of women in 
parliament, no other variables significantly affect SRW indicators.
9
 Thus:  
                                                          
8
 See: Beckwith, 2002; Beckwith and Cowell-Meyers, 2003.  
9
 However, in models using Women‟s Political Constraints as the dependent variable, the % of women in parliament 
is dropped. This is done because the variable itself contains percentage thresholds of women in parliament.  
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H4: As the number of women in parliament increases, SRW increases. 
The second control variable measures how many years have passed since women were 
granted full suffrage in each Latin American country. The literature points to a common 
connection between the length of time women have been allowed to participate in politics and 
the amount of representation women have been granted (Araujo and Garcia, 2006). The belief is 
that the longer women have been co-opted into the political process, the more influence they 
have been able to gain in politics. However, as we know that SRW varies widely across countries 
it is an important variable to include in this study. While some sociological and political 
literature sees the connection between suffrage and rights as a given, they discount the other 
institutions which may stand in the way of women‟s full participation in Latin America. For 
example, African Americans were granted the right to vote in the United States, long prior to 
women, but were de facto kept from voting through social and political institutions 
(Ansolabehere et al., 2001). In other words, the mere granting of suffrage does not necessarily 
mean that a minority group will be immediately enfranchised into the political process. This 
statement should certainly be tested. As the literature suggests: 
H5: As the years since women’s suffrage was granted increases, SRW increases. 
Two more control variables are also used widely across studies of SRW and thus will be 
included in the following analyses. These are GDP per capita and the level of democracy in each 
respective country. Other control variables are omitted in order to reduce the noise of the models 
while gathering as much preliminary information as possible. According to the literature, higher 
levels of development are assumed to create more political equity amongst minority and majority 
groups. Higher democratic levels, in turn, are assumed to ensure that the political and social 
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rights of minority groups are protected, thus eliminating the de facto practices which may keep 
these groups disadvantaged. Thus: 
H6: As GDP per capita increases, SRW increases. 
H7: As the level of democracy increases, SRW increases. 
3. DATA AND METHODS 
Several approaches to the data are employed in order to increase the confidence in this 
dissertation‟s analytical results. The first step is to use simple linear regression, regressing key 
explanatory variable on each of the dependent variables. This allows for the evaluation of the 
preliminary effect(s) of each independent variable on a particular dependent variable. The simple 
linear regression model is used and is expressed as: 
𝑌 =∝  + 𝛽𝑥 +  𝜀 
Five dependent variables, three independent variables, and four control variables are evaluated 
across eighteen countries in Latin America, over a twenty year span (1990-2010). The study is 
limited to this time frame because 1) data availability for this project deteriorates quickly when 
looking at decades earlier than 1990 and 2) twenty years is enough time to begin to show, at 
least, minimal changes across the variables in question, though increasing the number of years 
included in this study is ultimately desirable. The decision to focus on the Latin American region 
is cited in the literature review preceding this chapter and the first three dependent variables are 
all taken from the Cingranelli and Richards Human Rights dataset (2010) and are ciri_wecon, 
ciri_wosoc, and ciri_wopol. Each, as described above, is an index that captures the level of 
women‟s economic, social, and political rights, respectively. The other three dependent variables 
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are taken from various sources. Edenroll captures the percentage of women‟s enrollment in 
secondary education as compared to men‟s (UNESCO Institute for Statistics, 2010). The 
measure of women‟s fertility rate, wdi_fr, is taken from The World Development Indicators 
Catalogue and represents the number of children that would be born to a woman if she were to live 
to the end of her childbearing years and produce children in accordance with current age-specific 
fertility rates. Lastly, the labor measurement, w_labor, was created using statistics from the World 
Development Indicators Catalogue, and represents the total number of women employed in the 
formal labor sector, as compared to men. Each of the models is evaluated using random effects to 
account for within country clustering, or heteroskedasticity.  
The simple linear regression is performed using heteroskedastic consistent standard errors 
(Huber-White standard errors), clustered by country to account for the panel component. While 
some of the independent variables are significant, the coefficients found using the simple OLS 
model are likely to be both inefficient, due to large standard errors, and biased. This is reinforced 
by the amount of missing data that exist across the variables and across time. Thus, the results 
obtained using OLS are unreliable as the method is inappropriate for this data set. Because of the 
incomplete nature of the data, it is advised that a multiple imputation method is used to account 
for autocorrelation over time (see De Boef and Keele, 2008; Gelman et al., 1998; King et al., 
2001). Autocorrelation is likely to exist in the data due to the multiple missing observations. The 
multiple imputations are run using the ICE package for Stata using those independent variables 
without missing data as predictors. The following results presented are for an autoregressive 
panel model using ten imputed datasets. The autocorrelation is accounted for with the lagged 
dependent variable (see Beck, 2009) and heteroskedasticity is accounted for with a random 
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intercept. This is represented by the following model: 
 
Yit  =  ɑYit-1  +  XB  + ui  + eit 
…for i units, i=1,…,n measured at times t=1,…Ti (where Ti is used  instead of T to allow for 
unbalanced data).  
Models with interactive terms are included because of the possibility of multiple 
interactive effects among the electoral institutions. These models use the same methods as above 
but include an interactive term alongside the singular, interacted variables. Additionally, as many 
of the data used in this project take time to show significant change, such as education 
enrollment and the percentage of women in the workforce, the long-run multiplier of the 
coefficient is calculated for indicators that attain statistical significance. This is done in order to 
evaluate the strength of the statistical relationship against the theoretical argument. The long-run 
multipliers show the full effect of a change in x on the dependent variables, not just the 
instantaneous change (De Boef and Keele, 2008). Using the formula from Williams and Whitten 
the LRM is calculated. This is simply (coefficient/[1-lag of the DV]). The tables in the following 
section report the results of the regressed models and the long-run multipliers for significant 
variables.
10
 
4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
CIRI Variables 
The results of the statistical analyses are mixed. The models regressed on women‟s 
economic rights produce few interesting findings. Only the percent of women in parliament is 
                                                          
10
 GDP per capita is not included in the calculation of the long-run multipliers.  
 53 
statistically significant at the.1 level for Models I and II. This relationship, while weaker than 
expected, is predicted in the current literature. As the number of women in parliament increases, 
women‟s economic rights also appear to increase. The only other variable of significance at the 
.1 level is the measure of women‟s suffrage in Model III. Again, this is completely in-line with 
the predictions made in extant literature; the longer women have been included in the political 
process, the more likely it is to see an improvement in women‟s economic rights. For all four of 
these models, the null hypotheses cannot be rejected. On the surface, it appears that a permissive 
electoral environment does not greatly affect women‟s economic rights. The most logical 
explanation for the lack of significant findings falls back to the length of time it may take to see 
measurable change in the indicators being used. As most women in Latin America are still 
involved in the informal economic sector, rather than in the formal labor force, measuring 
increases in women‟s economic success may require that several more decade‟s worth of 
observations be included in the data in order to determine whether or not a permissive electoral 
environment, such as low vote thresholds, little incentive to campaign for a personal vote, and 
low levels of legislative fractionalization truly impact women‟s economic well-being in the 
region. The findings are reported in Table 5 below. 
The next models analyze the relationship between electoral institutions (the 
permissiveness of the electoral environment) and women‟s social rights. While there are again 
few significant findings, the vote threshold measure is significant in both Models I and IV. 
However, vote threshold is reported as positively related to women‟s social rights at the .1 level, 
which is in opposition to the hypothesized relationship. These findings suggest that as the vote 
threshold increases, women‟s social rights increase, rather than decrease. However, these 
models also show that women‟s suffrage and GDP per capita are also positively related to 
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women‟s social rights at the .05 and .01 levels, respectively.  
Table 5 
Regression Models of Women's Economic Rights 
  Model I Model II Model III Model IV 
Lag Women's Economic 
Rights 0.5343**** 0.5307**** 0.6437**** 0.6394**** 
  (0.0000) (0.0558) (0.0523) (0.0524) 
  
   
  
Vote Threshold 0.0069 
  
0.0004 
  (0.0121) 
  
(0.0121) 
  
   
  
Incentive for Personal Vote 
 
0.0067 
 
0.0082 
  
 
(0.0075) 
 
(0.0074) 
  
   
  
Legislative Fractionalization 
  
0.2207 0.1485 
  
  
(0.2078) (0.2273) 
  
   
  
% Women in Parliament 0.0053* 0.0063* 0.004 0.0043 
  (0.1050) (0.0034) (0.0034) (0.0035) 
  
   
  
Women's Suffrage 0.0038 0.0034 0.0049* 0.0043 
  (0.1900) (0.0028) (0.0030) (0.0030) 
  
   
  
Freedom House Score 0.0034 0.0071 0.0111 0.0194 
  (0.8600) (0.0207) (0.0229) (0.0244) 
  
   
  
GDP per Capita 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
  
   
  
Constant -6.9857 -6.2871 -9.5633* -8.3676 
  (5.6740) (5.6407) (5.9531) (6.0653) 
  
   
  
N 360 360 306 306 
p<.1*, p<.05**, p<.01***, p<.001**** 
 
Perhaps there is something that can be taken from this. When controlling for women‟s 
political enfranchisement and a country‟s level of development, the effective vote threshold is no 
longer a barrier to women‟s entrance into the political discussion. The more economically and 
socially advanced the nation, the more rights women are afforded socially. This is an intuitive 
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finding, fully explicated in works on modernization.
11
 Rather than needing more time to 
understand the relationship between the electoral institutions that create a more permissive 
environment for women in Latin America, we may be able to tentatively conclude that 
modernization is the driving force behind women‟s social status in those countries that fit into a 
category of higher development. While, again, this is not the hypothesized relationship it is still 
of importance, as it allows us to see that countries at higher levels of social and economic 
development may be able to overcome the most basic electoral barriers for women in politics. It 
is also interesting to find that the number of women in parliament is insignificant across all four 
of the models. This further bolsters the potential argument that modernization may be able to 
more effectively account for women‟s social rights than any political explanation based upon 
electoral systems or descriptive representation.  
 
The results become more interesting for those analyses modeling the relationship 
between women‟s political rights and electoral institutions. Significant results are found for 
two out of the three key institutional variables across Models I, II and IV. In Model I, vote 
threshold is found to be negatively related to women‟s political rights at the .1 level. Thus, the 
null hypothesis can be rejected and a tentative conclusion can be made; as the effective vote 
threshold increases, women‟s political rights decrease. This suggests, as hypothesized, that as 
the electoral environment becomes less permissive, women have a difficult time gaining 
substantive political rights. This same model finds that GDP per capita is positively related to 
women‟s political rights both at the .01 level. The conclusion may be that as more women 
                                                          
11
 The modernization of a nation is linked to its social progress and general economic development, which are 
believed to move a country out of a „traditional‟ society and into a „modern society‟. For a full discussion of 
modernization and its implications, please see Norris and Inglehart, 2001.  
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enter into the political arena in more economically developed states, effective vote thresholds 
negatively impact women‟s ability to turn their descriptive representation into substantive 
representation.  
 
Table 6 
Regression Models of Women's Social Rights 
  Model I Model II Model III Model IV 
Lag Women's Social Rights 0.4508**** 0.4542**** 0.4907**** 0.4696**** 
  (0.0600) (0.0606) (0.0578) (0.5093) 
  
   
  
Vote Threshold 0.0222* 
  
0.0256* 
  (0.0136) 
  
(0.0139) 
  
   
  
Incentive for Personal Vote 
 
-0.0077 
 
-0.0056 
  
 
(0.0078) 
 
(0.0083) 
  
   
  
Legislative Fractionalization 
  
0.0279 -0.0732 
  
  
(0.2467) (0.2715) 
  
   
  
% Women in Parliament 0.0056 0.0048 0.0056 0.0048 
  (0.0040) (0.0041) (0.0038) (0.0039) 
  
   
  
Women's Suffrage 0.0074** 0.0073** 0.0069** 0.0073** 
  (0.0034) (0.0035) (0.0033) (0.0034) 
  
   
  
Freedom House Score 0.0082 0.0009 0.0193 0.0253 
  (0.0209) (0.0211) (0.0252) (0.0267) 
  
   
  
GDP per Capita 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000** 0.0000** 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
  
   
  
Constant -14.1946** -13.8992** -13.9384** -13.9384** 
  (6.7911) (6.8400) (6.6055) (6.8239) 
  
   
  
N 360 360 306 306 
p<.1*, p<.05**, p<.01***, p<.001**** 
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Furthermore, Model II shows a negative and significant relationship (at the .05 level) 
between the incentive for personal campaigning and women‟s political rights. As in Model I, 
GDP per capita is also positively related to women‟s political rights at the .001 and .01 levels, 
respectively. Again, the null hypothesis can be rejected. When controlling for the level of 
economic development, the incentive to cultivate a personal vote decreases women‟s political 
rights. Simply having women in the legislature is not enough. A country must also be careful to 
cultivate an electoral atmosphere that encourages women‟s further enfranchisement by 
discouraging candidate-centered campaigns and encouraging campaigns that are focused on the 
aggregate party platform. The underlying logic exists in women‟s relatively new entrance into 
Latin American politics and the patriarchal dominance of the region‟s cultures (Arciniega et al., 
2008; Craske, 1999; Jaquette and Pescatello, 1973). Both of these things may make it important 
for women to run within established party platforms rather than being forced to cultivate a 
personal vote which may lead women to run on more extreme issues in order to be recognized 
(Carey and Shugart, 1995; Samuels, 1999). This extremism may make it difficult for women to 
obtain the votes they need in order to enter into the political arena. It may also make it more 
likely that if they are to win a seat based upon an extreme platform that they will encounter more 
traditional resistance within the legislature itself (Carey and Shugart, 1995; Samuels, 1999; 
Tremblay, 2008). The last scenario is one in which a woman is forced to run along traditional, 
conservative lines to avoid „rocking the boat‟, so to speak, and thus enters into the political arena 
unable to pursue women-specific policies which could increase SRW (Craske, 1999; Jaquette 
and Pescatello, 1973). With several viable theories as to why the cultivation of a personal vote is 
detrimental to SRW, the exact mechanism at work clearly needs further study.  
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Table 7 
Regression Models of Women's Political Rights 
  Model I Model II Model III Model IV 
Lag Women's Political Rights 0.5161**** 0.5023**** 0.6061**** 0.5890**** 
  (0.0539) (0.0541) (0.0526) (0.0528) 
  
   
  
Vote Threshold -0.0094 
  
-0.0067 
  (0.0074) 
  
(0.0070) 
  
   
  
Incentive for Personal Vote 
 
-0.0130** 
 
-0.0092** 
  
 
(0.0044) 
 
(0.0042) 
  
   
  
Legislative Fractionalization 
  
-0.1114 0.0018 
  
  
(0.1212) (0.1308) 
  
   
  
Women's Suffrage 0.0014 0.0021 0.001 0.0017 
  (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0017) (0.0017) 
  
   
  
Freedom House Score -0.0126 -0.0178 -0.0123 -0.0225*  
  (0.0138) (0.0141) (0.0130) (0.0138) 
  
   
  
GDP per Capita 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000**** 0.0000**** 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
  
   
  
Constant -2.0197 -3.2222 -1.2455 -2.4932 
  (3.2860) (3.2571) (3.3526) (3.3997) 
  
   
  
N 360 360 306 306 
p<.1*, p<.05**, p<.01***, p<.001**** 
 
The results of the full model, Model IV, are virtually identical to those in Model II, with 
the exception of less significance (.1 level) and a smaller negative coefficient on the personal 
vote measure. However, the implication is the same; as the incentive to cultivate a personal 
vote increases, SRW decreases. The null hypothesis can be rejected. Again, the number of 
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women in parliament and GDP per capita is positively related to women‟s political rights, both 
at the .001 level. Preliminarily, it appears that the incentive to cultivate a personal vote is more 
restrictive on SRW than is the effective vote threshold or legislative fractionalization measure. 
Yet this model also shows a negative and significant, at the .1 level, relationship between a 
country‟s Freedom House score and women‟s political rights. This is completely in line with 
the hypothesized relationship; as a country‟s level of democracy decreases, SRW decreases. 
Thus, Model IV shows that all else being equal, the incentive to cultivate a personal vote 
negatively impacts SRW.  
 
Traditional Variables  
As we move into evaluating SRW as measured by women‟s secondary school 
enrollment, we find similar results to those models using the CIRI dependent variables. In 
Model I, when controlling for the number of women in parliament, the effective vote threshold 
coefficient is negative and significant at the .05 level. Again, the null hypothesis cannot be 
rejected and the hypothesized negative relationship between effective vote thresholds and SRW 
is supported. However, it should be noted that the coefficient for the number of women in 
parliament is actually negative, suggesting that as the number of women in parliament 
increases, women‟s enrollment in secondary school decreases. This finding, while seemingly 
strange, may be easily explained by the difficulty in evaluating changes in secondary school 
enrollment over only a twenty year time span. The consistency of this variable‟s performance 
across every model for the dependent variable, excepting Model IV which reports a negative 
coefficient but no significance, lends support to the theoretical importance of time. School 
enrollment levels are notoriously slow to change as they are tied not just to policy but to 
 60 
economics, healthcare, and the penumbra of culture (Baldez, 2004; Carroll, 2001; Paxton and 
Hughes, 2007; Richards and Gelleny, 2007). Thus, the negative impact the number of women 
in parliament appears to have on SRW as measured by school enrollment may be reversed after 
another twenty or so years of data become available.
12
 
 
        Interestingly, Model III reports the first significant findings for the legislative 
fractionalization variable, showing that it is negatively related to SRW at a .05 level of 
significance. Increases in legislative fractionalization decreases SRW. However, this is again 
only when controlling for the number of women in parliament, which is negative and 
significant in this model. Legislative fractionalization is again negative and significant at the 
.05 level in Model IV as is effective vote threshold at .1. In this model, however, the incentive 
to cultivate a personal vote is positive at the .1 level and none of the control variables report 
any level of significance. In order to understand these findings, more work may need to be 
done. The implication is that when the less permissive institutions of high effective vote 
thresholds and increased levels of legislative fractionalization exist alongside an increased 
incentive to cultivate a personal vote, SRW is negatively impacted by the former but positively 
impacted by the latter. Theoretically, this result could simply reflect an overarching emphasis 
on increasing women‟s secondary school enrollment in Latin America. Still Model II, which 
focuses specifically on the possible effect(s) of personal vote cultivation on secondary school 
enrollment, comes nowhere near any level of significance. Perhaps another explanation should 
be considered. An increase in women‟s secondary school enrollment may actually be an 
unintended consequence of a push for increases in secondary school enrollment across the  
                                                          
12
 Education enrollment is typically measured by decades due to the rather glacial pace at which enrollment levels 
tend to change. This is also true for other educational indicators such as literacy rates and tertiary school enrollment 
levels. For further discussion please see Celis et al., 2008.  
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Table 8 
Regression Models of Women's Secondary School Enrollment 
  Model I Model II Model III Model IV 
Lag Women's Secondary 
School Enrollment 0.7070**** 0.7302**** 0.7172**** 0.6784**** 
  (0.4450) (0.0417) (0.0441) (0.0467) 
  
   
  
Vote Threshold -0.0032** 
  
-0.0033* 
  (0.0017) 
  
(0.0018) 
  
   
  
Incentive for Personal Vote 
 
0.0002 
 
0.0017* 
  
 
(0.0009) 
 
(0.0010) 
  
   
  
Legislative Fractionalization 
  
-0.0637**    -0.0658** 
  
  
(0.0291) (0.0317) 
  
   
  
% Women in Parliament -0.0006*  -0.0006*  -0.0007* -0.0006 
  (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
  
   
  
Women's Suffrage 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0004 -0.0006 
  (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
  
   
  
Freedom House Score 0.0013 0.0017 0.0031 0.0037 
  (0.0023) (0.0025) (0.0035) (0.0038) 
  
   
  
GDP per Capita 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000* 0.0000 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
  
   
  
Constant 0.3581 0.2257 1.1711 1.5104* 
  (0.6900) (0.6920) (0.8242) (0.8395) 
  
   
  
N 360 360 306 306 
p<.1*, p<.05**, p<.01***, p<.001**** 
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region, as Latin American countries are attempting to improve citizens‟ overall education as a 
step towards boosting the region‟s competitiveness in the world market (Paxton and Hughes, 
2007). In conclusion, as there is no widely-published theoretical explanation for this outcome, 
the finding warrants further quantitative and qualitative analysis.  
The models measuring SRW as women‟s fertility rates yield no significant results other 
than the reported negative relationship between SRW and the number of women in parliament 
across Models I and II (significant at .1). It appears, for these models, that only the number of 
women in parliament positively affects SRW. The permissiveness of the electoral environment is 
unimportant and, thus, the null hypotheses cannot be rejected. The only interesting finding is the 
switch from a negative to a positive coefficient on percent women in parliament in Model III, 
which includes the measure of legislative fractionalization. While that variable attains no 
significance, it is the only model in which the number of women in parliament is shown to 
actually decrease SRW.  But with the general lack of evidence produced by these models, solid 
inferences about the proposed relationship(s) cannot be drawn.  
Lastly, the four models measuring SRW as the percent of women in the formal labor force 
again produce findings which are counter to the hypothesized relationships (please see the table 
on the following page). In both Models II and IV, when controlling for the number of women 
in parliament, the years since women gained suffrage, and GDP per capita, the incentive to 
cultivate a personal vote is positive and significant at the .01 and .05 levels, respectively. The 
null hypothesis can be rejected but the findings indicate, again, that the incentive to cultivate a 
personal vote actually increases the number of women in the formal labor force. However, I 
suspect that, much like women‟s educational enrollment, the number of women in the formal 
labor force is increasing due to mitigating factors that have not been included in these 
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preliminary studies. These intervening variables may be important to find so that the 
complicated relationship between electoral institutions and SRW may be further explicated. 
This is outside of the scope of this dissertation. One final important note is that across Models 
II, III, and IV, the measure of women‟s suffrage is significant but negative. This implies that as 
the years since women were granted suffrage increases, women‟s participation in the formal 
labor force decreases. Again, there are most likely intervening variables which inform this 
outcome but are not accounted for in this study.  
        The results produced by the interactive models show little of interest. Regional controls 
are also introduced to the regression models, differentiating between South America, Central 
America and Mexico, with no change in results. The long-run multipliers reported strengthen 
the theory that a permissive electoral environment affects SRW. It also further demonstrates 
the point that many of the outcome variables take significant time to show change, as the 
coefficients are, on average, at least doubled when the multipliers are calculated. Thus, these 
multipliers work to show the full effect of a change in x on the dependent variables. 
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Table 9 
Regression Models of Women's Fertility Rate 
  Model I Model II Model III Model IV 
Lag Women's Fertility Rate 0.9579**** 0.9606**** 0.9797**** 0.9801**** 
  (0.0136) (0.0147) (0.0046) (0.0048) 
  
   
  
Vote Threshold 0.0050 
  
0.0029* 
  (0.0036) 
  
(0.0015) 
  
   
  
Incentive for Personal Vote 
 
0.0000 
 
0.0002 
  
 
(0.0024) 
 
(0.0009) 
  
   
  
Legislative Fractionalization 
  
0.0107 0.0072 
  
  
(0.0181) (0.0181) 
  
   
  
% Women in Parliament -0.0018*  -0.0017*  0.0004*  0.0004 
  (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
  
   
  
Women's Suffrage -0.0003 -0.0004 -0.0003 -0.0003 
  (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0005) (0.0005) 
  
   
  
Freedom House Score -0.0031 -0.0034 -0.0002 0.0063 
  (0.0051) (0.0054) (0.0020) (0.0231) 
  
   
  
GDP per Capita 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
  
   
  
Constant 0.7986 1.0538 0.7415 0.6475 
  (1.6944) (1.7276) (1.0372) (0.9746) 
  
   
  
N 360 360 306 306 
p<.1*, p<.05**, p<.01***, p<.001**** 
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Table 10 
Regression Models of Women in Formal Labor  
  Model I Model II Model III Model IV 
Lag Women in Labor 0.6339**** 0.6164**** 0.6192**** 0.6006**** 
  (0.0873) (0.0824) (0.0835) (0.0846) 
  
   
  
Vote Threshold 0.081
  
0.0768 
  (0.2198) 
  
(0.2709) 
  
   
  
Incentive for Personal Vote 
 
0.3437*** 
 
0.2902** 
  
 
(0.1242) 
 
(0.1230) 
  
   
  
Legislative 
Fractionalization 
  
4.8985 2.258 
  
  
(3.7685) (4.3069) 
  
   
  
% Women in Parliament 0.3218**** 0.3654**** 0.2955*** 0.3256*** 
  (0.0837) (0.0864) (0.0946) (0.0950) 
  
   
  
Women's Suffrage -0.1224 -0.1430**   -0.1279*  -0.1279*  
  (0.0566) (0.0571) (0.0653) (0.0669) 
  
   
  
Freedom House Score -0.4583 -0.4583 -0.5256 -0.2397 
  (0.2980) (0.2980) (0.4016) (0.4254) 
  
   
  
GDP per Capita 0.0000 0.0000* 0.0000 0.0000* 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
  
   
  
Constant 253.571** 292.1450*** 208.6140* 262.0070* 
  (112.5830) (113.4320) (130.5530) (133.7150) 
  
   
  
N 360 360 306 306 
p<.1*, p<.05**, p<.01***, p<.001**** 
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Table 11 
Long-Run Multipliers 
Women's Social Rights 
  Model I Model IV (Full Model) 
      
Vote Threshold 0.0404* 0.2568* 
  (0.0222) (0.0256) 
Year since Women Gained 
Right to Vote 0.0134** 0.0137** 
  (0.0074) (0.0073) 
p<.1*, p<.5**, p<.01***, p<.001**** 
Original Coefficients in Parentheses 
 
 
Table 12 
Long-Run Multipliers 
Women's Political Rights 
  Model I Model II Model IV 
        
Incentive for Personal Vote   -0.0196** -0.0163* 
    -(0.0098) -(0.0067) 
 
Freedom House Index     -0.0547* 
      -(0.0225) 
p<.1*, p<.5**, p<.01***, p<.001**** 
  Original Coefficients in Parentheses 
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Table 13 
Long-Run Multipliers 
Women's Enrollment in Secondary Education 
  Model I Model III Model IV 
        
Vote Threshold -0.0109* 
 
-0.0102* 
  -(0.0032) 
 
-(0.0033) 
Incentive for Personal Vote     0.0052* 
      0.0017 
Legislative Fractionalization   -0.2252** -0.2046** 
    -(0.0637) -(0.0658) 
% Women in Parliament -0.0020* -0.0024*   
  -(0.0006) -(0.0007)   
p<.1*, p<.5**, p<.01***, p<.001**** 
  Original Coefficients in Parentheses 
   
 
Table 14 
Long-Run Multipliers 
Women in The Formal Labor Force 
  Model II Model IV 
Incentive for Personal Vote 0.8959 0.7265** 
  0.3437 (0.2902) 
Years since Women Gained Right to 
Vote -0.3727 -0.3202* 
  -(0.1430) -(0.1279) 
p<.1*, p<.5**, p<.01***, p<.001**** 
 Original Coefficients in Parentheses 
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5. CONCLUSION 
The empirical results of this chapter make pertinent two things. First, while electoral 
institutions do impact levels of SRW, women must be present in parliament and there must be 
some degree of economic development. Secondly, it appears that the permissiveness of the 
electoral environment is important for women‟s substantive representation but that this 
relationship is only slightly accounted for by the models presented here. However, as it has long 
been argued that women‟s substantive representation is only explained by the number of women 
in parliament (please see: Beckwith, 2002; Beckwith and Cowell-Meyers, 2003; Celis and 
Childs, 2008; Celis et al., 2008), these models can, and should, serve as a jumping off point for 
further analysis. The three key electoral institutions in these models were chosen based upon 
their lower levels of correlation than many of the other electoral variables employed in extant 
studies. For instance, the most widely modeled variables, in relation to DRW and SRW, are 
district magnitude (M), closed lists, and PR versus SMD (Engstrom, 1987; Jones and Navia, 
1999; Matland and Studlar, 1996; Matland and Taylor, 1997). Using these variables in tandem 
with the three variables modeled in this chapter seriously distorts the empirical results. The 
relationships between these variables are highly reciprocal, as M may create the incentive to 
cultivate a personal vote, as may open lists. The simplification of the argument presented in these 
models provides researchers with a base upon which further analyses may be confidently 
conducted. The next set of institutions that must now be evaluated are those that pertain to 
political parties, as they may also provide valuable insight into the true effects of a country‟s 
institutions on women‟s substantive representation.  
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CHAPTER IV: PARTY INSTITUTIONS AND WOMEN‟S SUBSTANTIVE 
REPRESENTATION IN LATIN AMERICA 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Do the party institutions of Latin America affect levels of SRW? According to extant 
literature, party institutions, like electoral institutions, influence the permissiveness of the 
political environment. The importance of an environment's permissiveness lies in its ability to 
either help or hinder women‟s substantive representation (Neto and Cox, 1997; Remmer, 2008). 
In this case, it is believed that higher levels of party power centralization may restrict the overall 
permissiveness of the political environment and thus be detrimental to SRW (Celis et al., 2008; 
Caul, 1999; Lijphart, 1994). It should be noted that studies show that party institutions can 
significantly affect the likelihood of minority election in legislatures (Beckwith, 2002; Caul, 
1999; Lijphart, 1994, 1999). Generally, it is thought that high levels of party power centralization 
should lead to high levels of DRW (Caul, 1999; Kittilson, 2006; Paxton and Hughes, 2007; Tripp 
and Kang, 2008). This is attributed to both the exogenous and endogenous pressures that parties 
face to include more women on their ballots, in their ranks, and in the legislature (Bih-er and 
Clark, 1990; Dahlerup, 2006; Tripp and Kang, 2008).
13
 The conclusion is that higher levels of 
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 Substantive representation is often achieved when endogenous pressures push leaders to incorporate more women 
into the political system (Celis et al., 2008; Celis and Childs, 2008; Dodson, 2006; Thomas and Wilcox, 1998). 
Deciding to include women serves as a signal that the government, and/or its people, wants to address women‟s 
interests by increasing their opportunity(ies) to participate in the policy-making process. The expected outcome is 
that legislatures will contain more women and produce more legislation specifically addressing women‟s needs 
(Thomas and Cox, 1998). Researchers also believe that exogenous factors affect SRW (Celis et al., 2008; Celis and 
Childs, 2008; Mackay, 2008). In a world which offers cheap information, contains an increasing number of 
influential NGOs, IGOs, and IOs leaders may be pushed to include more women to avoid backlash from Western 
nations who purport to push for high levels of female legislative membership (Celis et al., 2008; Celis and Childs, 
2008; Mackay, 2008) 
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party power centralization lead to more female co-partisans in the legislature but this does not 
account for any influence these institutions may have on SRW (Beckwith, 2002; Celis and 
Childs, 2008; Celis et al., 2008). Thus we have only a minimal understanding of how party 
institutions work to elect women, not how they contribute to women‟s substantive representation.  
 Analyses of party institutions as they relate to SRW are included in this dissertation in 
order to enrich our understanding of the possible effect(s) party institutions may have on SRW, 
rather than DRW. This will contribute to the scholarly literature on SRW through testing a set of 
hypotheses meant to broaden the possible institutional explanations for varying levels of SRW 
across Latin American countries. Aside from almost exclusively modeling the relationship 
between party institutions (as the independent variables) and DRW (as the main dependent 
variable), just as with electoral institutions the majority of extant studies in this field have mainly 
focused on Western, industrialized democracies (Ansolabehere et al., 2001; Caul, 1999; Darcy et 
al., 1994; Reynolds, 1999). This chapter builds upon these studies by 1) using a comparative 
approach and quantitative methods to model the relationship between party institutions and 
SRW, rather than DRW 2) using data collected from developing countries (Latin America, 
specifically) rather than developed countries and 3) using the number of women in parliament 
(DRW) as a control, rather than independent, variable. Taken together, these adjustments should 
provide us with a new understanding of the relationship between party institutions and SRW and 
produce a valuable contribution to the literature by studying developing, rather than developed, 
nations.  
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2. VARIABLES AND HYPOTHESES 
 A. DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
This chapter asks whether or not certain party institutions create more or less permissive 
political environments that, in turn, measurably affect women‟s substantive representation. In 
order to answer this question, the same dependent variables used to model the relationship(s) 
between electoral institutions and SRW are used to model the relationship(s) between Latin 
American party institutions and SRW. More precisely, the three CIRI variables (women‟s 
economic rights, women‟s social rights, and women‟s political rights) are used alongside the 
three traditional measures of SRW (women‟s enrollment in secondary education, women‟s 
fertility rates, and the % women in the formal labor force) to investigate what effect, if any, 
political party institutions have on SRW. Using identical variables across the models in both 
chapters is justified by the desire to compare and generalize any meaningful results. Essentially 
the same question is being asked across both chapters; do a particular set of institutions, in this 
case political party institutions, affect SRW? Thus, the variables that are appropriate for Chapter 
III are also appropriate for the analyses in Chapter IV.
14
  
  B. INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
 There is a wide variety of political party institutions present in Latin America. For 
instance, there are divides along ideological tendencies, power centralization, and geographical 
support (Coppedge, 2007). There are also differences in party age and the strength of a party‟s 
hierarchical organization (Coppedge, 2007). While the general community may perceive these 
differences to be negligible, variance in party power and organization may have important 
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 For a complete discussion of the dependent variables used in this chapter‟s analyses, including the source(s) from 
which they are drawn, the exact definitions adopted, and the assumptions made about their use, please refer to 
Chapter III, Section 2, Subheading A of this dissertation. 
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implications for researchers of representation in Latin America. This may prove to be especially 
true for researchers of women’s representation.  
Party Power Centralization 
More specifically, the most important of these variables for studies of SRW may be the 
overarching category of „party power centralization‟. The roots of this argument lie with 
Duverger‟s 1954 proposal that there are “mechanical and psychological” effects created by party 
systems. These effects affect both party members and constituents, respectively. Duverger rests 
his argument on the basic assumption that elected officials act strategically to maintain their 
seats, but he also posits that the party as a whole acts strategically to maintain power (1954). 
Thus, the elite strata in charge of organizing all lower levels of a party are often responsible for 
the party‟s electoral strategy (Cox, 1997; Duverger, 1954). As discussed in Chapter II and in this 
chapter‟s introduction, there are often internal and external pressures on parties to increase the 
number of women in their ranks (Bih-er and Clark, 1990; Dahlerup, 2006; Tripp and Kang, 
2008). We see evidence of this pressure throughout Latin America in the policies adopted by 
many parties across geographical boundaries regardless of ideology (Coppedge, 2007). In light 
of this evidence, we may then reasonably assume that a party‟s strategic behavior, in the context 
of increasing women‟s representation, may be cultivated by those with the most control over the 
party organization: the party elite.
 15
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 Although it is plausible that the consensus of the entire party membership could be taken into account in the 
decision to take measures to enhance the opportunity for women to enter, or bar women from entering, the party, 
problems of collective action should dictate the those at the top of the organization, the elite, will make the majority 
of the decisions for the party without an in-depth consultation with lower-level party members. In the event that 
lower-level members are consulted, there is still no guarantee that the elites will take this consensus into account 
during the decision-making process.  
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If the decisions are made almost exclusively „at the top‟, the desires of the general party 
members and those of the elites may be considerably disconnected (Kahneman and Tversky, 
1984; Kenworthy and Malami, 1999).
16
 However, the elites are the most visible members of the 
organization, and are the easiest targets for public backlash if constituents feel that their interests 
are not being properly represented. This poses a particular problem for party elites as it relates to 
increasing women‟s representation. If there is a difference in opinion, do the party elites do what 
the general party members wish to maintain power within the organization or do they remain 
accountable to the public for fear of losing both their personal seat(s) as well as risking party 
control or presence (depending upon the size and success of the party within a given system)? 
With the international environment pushing for higher numbers of female parliamentarians, it 
appears that most party elites have only one course of action: adopt policies that are shown to get 
more women into legislatures (Caul, 1999; Kenworthy and Malami, 1999; Lijphart, 1994).   
This may mean the displacement of male party members to make room for women within 
the party (Bratton, 2005). The implication is that resentment may brew between incumbent party 
members and the party elite and male legislators and new, female legislators (Kenworthy and 
Malami, 1999). The assumption is that the incumbent male legislators are less willing to 
assimilate women into the daily workings of politics and are more likely to move them into the 
„token‟ category (Bratton, 2005; Tremblay, 2006). In other words, when the party elite decides to 
take measures to increase the number of women in parliament, regardless of the desires of the 
remaining party members, they run the risk of creating resentment that translates into the 
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 This assumption is found throughout political science literature and exits across regions and over time. For a more 
complete discussion of the logic underlying this assumption, please see: Jones et al., 2002; Lee, 2008; Price, 1975; 
Samuels, 2000) 
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marginalization of women within the legislature (Bih-er and Clark, 1990; Bratton, 2005; Goetz, 
2003; Skard and Haavio-Mannila, 1985; Tremblay, 2006).
17
 Overall, then, the hypothesis is that: 
H8: As party power centralization increases, SRW decreases. 
To analyze this very general hypothesis, party power centralization must be broken down 
into measurable parts. In accordance with the literature on the connection between power 
centralization and women‟s representation, three distinct variables are chosen. These are 1) 
control over the election of executive candidates 2) control over the election of legislative 
candidates and 3) party control over the ballot structure. Each of these variables is chosen to 
capture a specific element of party power centralization. The first variable, named Executive 
Election (iaep_pveec) is a dummy variable which equals 1 if members of a party vote (primary) 
to establish how the field of candidates who stand for executive elections is determined, and 0 if 
otherwise. This variable is measured on the first of January in each observed year by the 
Institutions and Elections Project (2010). Control over the method of executive election is 
typically determined by the party elite who may set the rules from which the general party may 
choose or who hand may pick the next candidate, limiting the influence of general party 
members (Pande and Ford, 2011; Reingold, 2006).  A score of 1 on this variable generally 
indicates higher levels of party power centralization. Thus: 
H9: If members of a party vote to establish how the field of executive candidates is determined, 
SRW decreases. 
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 Studies indicate that male legislators can „control the treatment‟ that women receive once elected (Darcy, 
1996:888-89). This marginalization amounts to the relegation of women to less influential positions such as chairing 
committees typically considered to be of minor importance. In reality, There are very few women in positions of 
power within legislatures. For more on this topic please see: Kathlene, 1994; Pande and Ford, 2011; Reingold, 
2006). 
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The next variable, Legislative Election (iaep_pvelc), is taken from the same data set 
(Institutions and Elections Project 2010). Legislative Election equals 1 if members of a party 
vote (primary) to establish how the field of candidates who stand for legislative elections is 
determined, and 0 otherwise. The same logic is applied to this variable as to Executive Election. 
If it is true that the party elite typically control the choices available to general party members, a 
score of 1 on the Legislative Election variable indicates higher levels of party power 
centralization. Similarly: 
H10: If members of a party vote to establish how the field of legislative candidates is determined, 
SRW decreases. 
 
The third key explanatory variable is Ballot Control (jw_mmdballot). This variable is 
coded for multi-member district elections to the lower house and is taken from the Johnson and 
Wallack (2006) database
18
, whose underlying rationale for coding is derived directly from the 
following Carey and Shugart (1995) excerpt. The Ballot Control variable focuses on: 
…the amount of party control over candidates‟ access to a competitive position on the 
ballot. The variables equal (in order of increasing personal vote incentives): 
(0) where parties control access to ballots as well as the order in which individuals 
will fill the seats that the party wins (closed list multi-member districts, open 
list multi-member districts with little or no de facto change in list order); 
(1) where parties control access to the ballot, but not the order in which candidates 
will receive seats (open lists where intra-party preference votes seem to have a 
significant influence on which candidates are selected, and single-member 
districts where parties control access to the list); 
(2) where there are few or no impediments to individual candidates‟ ability to 
appear on the ballot (single-member districts where parties do not control 
access, e.g. allowing independent candidates and/or use primaries to select 
candidates) (Carey and Shugart, 1995: 421).  
 
This particular variable is chosen because Latin America is dominated by presidential, PR 
systems, making it appropriate to use in this region-specific study (Araujo and Garcia, 2006; 
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 See: http://dss.ucsd.edu/~jwjohnso/espv.htm 
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Costa Benavides, 2003; Htun and Jones, 2002). Again, the implication of higher levels of party 
control is that this power is concentrated in the hands of party elite. The higher the score on 
ballot control, the more concentrated is party power centralization. This, again, may result in 
negative behaviors from lower-level party members such as the willful marginalization of 
women in legislative chambers (Bratton, 2005; Kathlene, 1994; Norris and Lovenduski, 2001). 
Thus, 
H11: As party control over the ballot increases, SRW decreases. 
3. DATA AND METHODS 
 The data and methods used to perform the statistical analyses in this chapter are virtually 
identical to those used in the previous chapter. The data used here comprises five dependent 
variables, three independent variables, and four control variables, which are introduced in the 
section which immediately precedes this one. Again, eighteen countries across Central and South 
America and the Caribbean are evaluated over a twenty year time span (1990-2010). The use of 
this limited time frame is explicated in Chapter III, Section 3, as is the justification for this 
project‟s focus on the Latin American region. As a reminder, the first three dependent variables 
are all taken from the Cingranelli and Richards Human Rights dataset (2010) and are ciri_wecon, 
ciri_wosoc, and ciri_wopol. Each, as described above, is an index that captures the level of 
women‟s economic, social, and political rights, respectively. The other three dependent variables 
are taken from various sources. Edenroll captures the percentage of women‟s enrollment in 
secondary education as compared to men‟s (UNESCO Institute for Statistics, 2010). The 
measure of women‟s fertility rate, wdi_fr, is taken from The World Development Indicators 
Catalogue and represents the number of children that would be born to a woman if she were to live 
to the end of her childbearing years and produce children in accordance with current age-specific 
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fertility rates. Lastly, the labor measurement, w_labor, was created using statistics from the World 
Development Indicators Catalogue, and represents the total number of women employed in the 
formal labor sector, as compared to men. 
The first step to evaluating the data at hand is to use a simple linear regression model. 
Each key explanatory variable is regressed on each dependent variable using simple linear 
regression with heteroskedastic consistent standard errors (Huber-White standard errors), 
clustered by country to account for the panel component of the data. The preliminary effects are 
then examined. However, the coefficients found using the simple OLS model are likely to be 
both inefficient, due to large standard errors, and biased. This is reinforced by the amount of 
missing data that exist across the variables and across time. Thus, the results obtained using OLS 
are unreliable, as the method is inappropriate for this data set. 
Because of the incomplete nature of the data, it is advised that a multiple imputation 
method is used to account for autocorrelation over time (see De Boef and Keele, 2008; Gelman 
et al., 1998; King et al., 2001). Autocorrelation is likely to exist in the data due to the multiple 
missing observations. The multiple imputations are run using the ICE package for Stata using 
those independent variables without missing data as predictors. The following results presented 
are for an autoregressive panel model using ten imputed datasets. The autocorrelation is 
accounted for with the lagged dependent variable and heteroskedasticity is accounted for with a 
random intercept.  
Models with interactive terms are included because of the possibility of multiple 
interactive effects among the electoral institutions. These models use the same methods as above 
but include an interactive term alongside the singular, interacted variables. Additionally, as many 
of the data used in this project take time to show significant change, such as education 
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enrollment and the percentage of women in the workforce, the long-run multiplier of the 
coefficient is calculated for indicators that attain statistical significance. This is done in order to 
evaluate the strength of the statistical relationship against the theoretical argument. The long-run 
multipliers show the full effect of a change in x on the dependent variables, not just the 
instantaneous change (De Boef and Keele, 2008). Using the formula from Williams and Whitten 
the LRM is calculated. This is simply (coefficient/[1-lag of the DV]). The following tables report 
the results of the regressed models and the long-run multipliers for significant coefficients.
1920
 
 
4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
CIRI Variables 
 As in the previous chapter, the results of the analyses are mixed. Beginning with a 
discussion of Women‟s Economic Rights, party control over executive nomination is negatively 
related to women‟s economic rights at the .1 level. This indicates that as party power 
centralization increases, SRW decreases. However, the percent of women in parliament is also 
significant and positive at .1. Thus, controlling for the % women in parliament, party power 
centralization negatively impacts SRW. Nothing else in this model is significant. Model II also 
shows support for the hypothesis that increased levels of party power centralization decrease 
SRW. Party control over legislative nominations is negative and significant at the .01 level. GDP 
per capita is the only other significant variable in this model. Controlling for GDP per capita, 
party power centralization decreases SRW. However, Model III yields no significant findings 
indicating that a party‟s control over the ballot does not affect the economic rights of women. 
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 GDP per capita is not included in the calculation of the long-run multipliers.  
20
 The natural log of GDP per capita is calculated and each model is run with this control variable. Subsequently 
each model is run with the simple measure of GDP per capita. There is almost no difference in results between the 
two variables. I chose to report the models which use the simple measure of GDP per capita.  
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Table 15 
Regression Models of Women's Economic Rights 
  Model I Model II Model III Model IV 
_lag 0.5186**** 0.5085**** 0.5344**** 0.5009**** 
  (0.0560) (0.0561) (0.0553) (0.0562) 
  
   
  
Control over Executive 
Nomination -0.1339* 
  
0.3716* 
  (0.0744) 
  
(0.2215) 
  
   
  
Control over Legislative 
Nomination 
 
-0.1949*** 
 
-0.5868*** 
  
 
(0.0783) 
 
(0.2364) 
  
   
  
Ballot Control 
  
-0.0024 0.0338 
  
  
(0.0400) (0.0424) 
  
   
  
% Women in Parliament 0.0061* 0.0062 0.0055 -0.0069** 
  (0.0034) (0.0033) (0.0035) (0.0035) 
  
   
  
Year(s) since Women Gained 
Right to Vote 0.0036 0.0034 0.0036 0.0034 
  (0.0028) (0.0028) (0.0029) (0.0028) 
  
   
  
Freedom House Score -0.0010 -0.0030 0.0026 -0.0018 
  (0.0197) (0.1973) (0.0202) (0.0201) 
  
   
  
GDP per Capita 0.0000 0.0000* 0.0000 0.0000 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
  
   
  
Constant -6.5316 -6.1906 -6.6903 -6.2824 
  (5.6333) (5.6071) (5.7186) (5.6745) 
  
   
  
N 360 360 360 360 
p<.1*, p<.05**, p<.01***, p<.001**** 
 
Thus, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected; there may be no relationship between party power 
centralization, as measured through ballot control, and SRW. The full model, Model IV, again 
reports both party control over executive and legislative nomination as significant explanatory 
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variables. However, the sign of control over executive nomination changes direction, becoming 
positively related to women‟s economic rights at the .1 level.  
Table 16 
Regression Models of Women's Social Rights 
  Model I Model II Model III Model IV 
_lag 0.4381**** 0.4358**** 0.4539**** 0.4358**** 
  (0.0626) (0.0625) (0.0605) (0.0632) 
  
   
  
Control over Executive 
Nomination -0.1596* 
  
0.1029 
  (0.0835) 
  
(0.2311) 
  
   
  
Control over Legislative 
Nomination 
 
-0.1908** 
 
-0.2888 
  
 
(0.0886) 
 
(0.2470) 
  
   
  
Ballot Control 
  
-0.0450 -0.0166 
  
  
(0.0421) (0.0436) 
  
   
  
% Women in Parliament 0.0063* 0.0063* 0.0045 0.0058 
  (0.0041) (0.0041) (0.0042) (0.0044) 
  
   
  
Year(s) since Women 
Gained Right to Vote 0.0070* 0.0068** 0.0066** 0.0066* 
  (0.0034) (0.0034) (0.0033) (0.0034) 
  
   
  
Freedom House Score 0.0016 0.0004 0.0025 -0.0006 
  (0.0208) (0.0208) (0.0208) (0.0209) 
  
   
  
GDP per Capita 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
  
   
  
Constant -13.2050* -12.875 -12.4700* -12.4323* 
  (6.7929) (6.7694) (6.6503) (6.7413) 
  
   
  
N 360 360 360 360 
p<.1*, p<.05**, p<.01***, p<.001**** 
 
The second variable remains negative at the .01 level. The only other significant variable is the 
% of women in parliament which is negative at .05.  Table 16 presents very similar findings. As 
opposed to measuring SRW through an indicator of women‟s economic rights, these models 
employ the CIRI measure of women‟s social rights. The results are posted in the table above.  
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Again the hypotheses regarding party control over executive and legislative nominations 
are supported. Both of these variables are negative and significant at the .1 and .05 levels, 
respectively. Ballot control is again insignificant and the null hypothesis that there is no 
relationship between SRW and party power centralization, as measured by a party‟s level of 
ballot control, cannot be rejected. However, when SRW is measured as women‟s social, rather 
than economic, rights three of the four control variables become significant. For both Models I 
and II, controlling for the number of women in parliament, the years since women were granted 
suffrage and GDP per capita, party power centralization decreases SRW. In the full model, only 
the years since women were granted suffrage and GDP per capita are significant (p<.1, p< .01). 
When women‟s political rights are introduced as the proxy of SRW, the results are 
somewhat different. Now the % women in parliament is significant across all four of the models 
at the highest level possible for these analyses (p<.001). The nomination variables are no longer 
significant as they were for women‟s economic and social rights, though the sign remains 
negative, but the ballot control measure is significant and in the expected direction (p<.05). In 
sum, controlling for the % of women in parliament and GDP per capita, as a party‟s control over 
the ballot increases, women‟s political rights decrease. There are no other significant findings in 
these models.  
 Although there are relatively few significant findings, what is significant may be 
important for scholars of SRW in Latin America. First, the results in Tables 15 and 16 show that 
a party‟s control over the executive and/or legislative nomination negatively affects women‟s 
economic and social rights. Theoretically, this may be the result of the intentional legislative 
marginalization of women (Bih-er and Clark, 1990; Bratton, 2005; Goetz, 2003; Skard and 
Haavio-Mannila, 1985; Tremblay, 2006).  
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Table 17 
Regression Models of Women's Political Rights 
  Model I Model II Model III Model IV 
_lag 0.5242**** 0.5240**** 0.5052**** 0.5031**** 
  (0.0535) (0.0534) (0.0542) (0.0540) 
  
   
  
Control over Executive 
Nomination 0.0043 
  
-0.0307 
  (0.0445) 
  
(0.1283) 
  
   
  
Control over 
Legislative Nomination 
 
0.0000 
 
0.0158 
  
 
(0.0471) 
 
(0.1371) 
  
   
  
Ballot Control 
  
-0.0701** -0.0772** 
  
  
(0.0236) (0.0251) 
  
   
  
Year(s) since Women 
Gained Right to Vote 0.0016 0.0016 0.0012 0.0012 
  (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0016) 
  
   
  
Freedom House Score -0.0118 -0.0119 -0.015 -0.0147 
  (0.0138) (0.0139) (0.0138) (0.0141) 
  
   
  
GDP per Capita 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
  
   
  
Constant -2.3816 -2.3589 -1.5722 -1.5869 
  (3.2738) (3.2798) (3.2770) (3.2959) 
  
   
  
N 360 360 360 360 
p<.1*, p<.05**, p<.01***, p<.001****     
 
As the power of the party elite increases, the power of the rank and file party members decreases 
(Kenworthy and Malami, 1999). Operating on the assumption that elected legislators act 
strategically to keep their seats, relinquishing power to higher levels of the party may not be in 
the incumbent‟s best interest (Bratton, 2005; Tremblay, 2006). Thus, if women are entering the 
political arena at the behest of party leaders and displacing other parliamentarians, tokenism and 
marginalization may prevail within the chambers (Bih-er and Clark, 1990; Bratton, 2005; Goetz, 
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2003; Skard and Haavio-Mannila, 1985; Tremblay, 2006). Although more women are physically 
entering into politics, fewer policies specifically aimed at increasing the well-being of women 
are being produced. This may be why a negative relationship is found to exist between party 
power centralization and SRW. The full model of women‟s economic rights yields more 
puzzling results. In this model, control over executive nominations increases women‟s economic 
rights while the simultaneous control over legislative nominations decreases women‟s economic 
rights. Furthermore, the % of women in parliament is found to be negatively related to women‟s 
economic rights. These findings are completely unaccounted for in the literature and it may take 
more sophisticated modeling techniques to discover what, if any, value these results may 
contribute to our understanding of what party institutions affect levels of SRW. 
 The final CIRI dependent variable, Women‟s Political Rights, provides simple but strong 
evidence in support of the theory presented above. As party power centralization increases, 
SRW, as measured by women‟s political rights, decreases. Not surprisingly, GDP per capita is 
also an important control variable suggesting that as both modernization and the number of 
women in parliament increase, party power centralization negatively affects SRW. The party 
institutions work to mitigate the potential positive effects that an increase of women in 
parliament may have on women‟s overall well-being. Again, this is most often theorized to be 
the result of legislative marginalization perpetrated at the hand of incumbents and lower-level 
party members who do not agree with the elite push for increased numbers of women in power 
(Bih-er and Clark, 1990; Dahlerup, 2006; Tripp and Kang, 2008). Overall, there is some 
evidence that party institutions affect levels of SRW when the CIRI variables are used in 
analyses.  
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Traditional Dependent Variables 
 The models using two of the more traditional dependent variables, women‟s secondary 
school enrollment and women‟s fertility rates, seemingly provide no new insights about the 
relationship between DRW and SRW. Instead, the only significant independent variable in any 
of the eight models across the two outcome variables is the % of women in parliament (p<.1). 
This is exactly what the majority of extant literature would predict; as the number of women in 
parliament increases, SRW increases. However, it may be important to note that this variable is 
shown to be negatively related to the number of women enrolled in secondary education. This 
implies that as the number of women in parliament increases, women‟s enrollment in secondary 
education decreases. The problem here most likely lies in the amount of time it takes to see any 
changes manifest in educational enrollment. Although data is examined across twenty years, it 
may take far longer for significant changes in the numbers of school enrollment. On the other 
hand, the negative relationship between the percent of women in parliament and women‟s 
fertility rates is again exactly what extant literature predicts; as the number of women in 
parliament increases, SRW increases.
21
 Thus, these models reinforce the theory that increased 
numbers of women in Latin American parliaments increases women‟s substantive representation, 
ceteris paribus.  
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 Lower fertility rates are interpreted as a sign of better quality of life for women (Schwindt-Bayer, 2010; Xydias, 
2010).  
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Table 18 
Regression Models Women's Enrollment in Secondary Education 
 
Model I Model II Model III Model IV 
_lag 0.7317**** 0.7312**** 0.7312**** 0.7265**** 
 
(0.0422) (0.0421) (0.0420) (0.0430) 
     
Control over Executive 
Nomination -0.0025 
  
0.0152 
 
(0.0099) 
  
(0.0318) 
     
Control over Legislative 
Nomination 
 
-0.0045 
 
-0.0199 
  
(0.0102) 
 
(0.0329) 
     Ballot Control 
  
-0.0003 0.0005 
   
(0.0051) (0.0054) 
     
% Women in Parliament -0.0006* -0.0006* -0.0006* -0.0006* 
 
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
     
Year(s) since Women Gained 
Right to Vote 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
     
Freedom House Score 0.0015 0.0015 0.0016 0.0015 
 
(0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0024) (0.0024) 
     GDP per Capita 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
     Constant 0.2145 0.2279 0.2147 0.2486 
 
(0.6897) (0.6898) (0.6994) (0.7016) 
     N 360 360 360 360 
p<.1*, p<.05**, p<.01***, p<.001**** 
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Table 19 
Regression Models of Women's Fertility Rates 
 
Model I Model II Model III Model IV 
_lag 0.9625**** 0.9630**** 0.9582**** 0.9560**** 
 
(0.0136) (0.0138) (0.0154) (0.0158) 
     
Control over 
Executive Nomination 0.0232 
  
0.0611 
 
(0.0218) 
  
(0.0709) 
     
Control over 
Legislative 
Nomination 
 
0.0194 
 
-0.0374 
  
(0.0231) 
 
(0.0758) 
     Ballot Control 
  
-0.0045 -0.0092 
   
(0.0134) (0.0140) 
     
% Women in 
Parliament -0.0018* -0.0018* -0.0019* -0.0021 
 
(0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0011) 
     
Year(s) since Women 
Gained Right to Vote -0.0004 -0.0018 -0.0004 -0.0005 
 
(0.0008) (0.0010) (0.0008) (0.0008) 
     
Freedom House Score -0.0026 -0.0026 -0.0039 -0.0037 
 
(0.0052) (0.0052) (0.0053) (0.0054) 
     GDP per Capita 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
     Constant 1.0372 1.0342 1.0785 1.0857 
 
(1.6858) (0.6868) (1.6885) (1.6913) 
     N 360 360 360 360 
p<.1*, p<.05**, p<.01***, p<.001**** 
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 The final traditional dependent variable used in the literature is the percent of women in 
the formal labor force. The results of these models are presented in the table below.  
Table 20 
Regression Models of % Women in Formal Labor Force 
  Model I Model II Model III Model IV 
_lag 0.6357**** 0.6361**** 0.5770**** 0.5699**** 
  (0.0857) (0.0855) (0.0850) (0.0848) 
  
   
  
Control over 
Executive 
Nomination 0.4784 
  
-0.1944 
  (1.2614) 
  
(5.2344) 
  
   
  
Control over 
Legislative 
Nomination 
 
0.5919 
 
-1.1049 
  
 
(1.2778) 
 
(5.5024) 
  
   
  
Ballot Control 
  
2.8047**** 3.0495**** 
  
  
(0.7032) (0.7554) 
  
   
  
% Women in 
Parliament 0.3196**** 0.3204**** 0.4114**** 0.4226**** 
  (0.0823) (0.0833) (0.0921) (0.0885) 
  
   
  
Year(s) since Women 
Gained Right to Vote -0.1224** -0.1218** -0.1137** -0.1159** 
  (0.0570) (0.0569) (0.0568) (0.0567) 
  
   
  
Freedom House 
Score -0.4504* -0.4458* -0.3271 -0.3571 
  (0.2983) (0.2981) (0.3115) (0.3138) 
  
   
  
GDP per Capita -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0004** -0.0004*** 
  (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
  
   
  
Constant 253.598** 252.3800 236.8020** 241.5430** 
  (113.4390) (113.0830) (112.8060) (112.5400) 
  
   
  
N 360 360 360 360 
p<.1*, p<.05**, p<.01***, p<.001**** 
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Not surprisingly the measure of DRW, % of women in parliament, is found to be positive and 
significant (p<.001). This again supports the main findings in extant literature, at least in Models 
I and II. The null hypothesis that there is no relationship between party power institutions and 
SRW cannot be rejected. However, in Models III and IV the ballot control measure is found to 
be positive and significant at the .001 level. This indicates that as party power centralization 
increases, SRW increases. While the null hypotheses can be rejected in these models, the 
findings contradict the predicted direction of the relationship. Theoretically, this may simply be 
another case of having too little information on the dependent variable to draw any meaningful 
conclusions. As most Latin American women still operate outside of the formal labor force in the 
informal sector there may be too few, misreported, or skewed values of women‟s labor force 
participation (Craske, 1999). This is the similar to the problem encountered when using women‟s 
secondary school enrollment as the dependent variable. It may be necessary to allow more time 
to pass before these variables reflect measurable, meaningful change (Schwindty-Bayer, 2010). 
As a last note, none of the interactive models or the models with regional controls (Central 
America, South America, and Mexico) produce any significant findings. The long run multipliers 
calculated for the significant coefficients are in the tables that follow. The reported LRMs do 
show a strengthening of the relationships over time but do not produce unexpected or remarkable 
results that call for new, or further, interpretation of the findings.  
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Table 21 
Long-run Multipliers 
Women's Economic Rights 
 
Model I Model II Model IV 
Party Vote Executive 
Candidate -0.2781* 
 
0.7705* 
 
-(0.1339) 
 
(0.3908) 
    
Party Vote Legislative 
Candidate 
 
-0.3965*** -1.2182*** 
  
-(0.1949) -(0.6179) 
    
% Women in Parliament 0.0126* 0.0126* 0.0066* 
 
(0.0061) (0.0062) (0.0130) 
p<.1*, p<.5**, p<.01***, p<.001**** 
Original Coefficients in Parentheses 
 
Table 22 
Long-run Multipliers 
Women's Social Rights 
  Model I Model II 
Party Vote Executive Candidate -0.2840*   
  -(0.1596)   
  
 
  
Party Vote Legislative Candidate 
 
-0.3381** 
  
 
-(0.1908) 
  
 
  
% Women in Parliament 0.00112* 0.0111* 
  (0.0063) (0.0063) 
  
 
  
Years since Women Gained Right to 
Vote 0.0124** 0.0120** 
  (0.0070) (0.0068) 
p<.1*, p<.5**, p<.01***, p<.001**** 
Original Coefficients in Parentheses 
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5. CONCLUSION 
 The findings of this chapter mainly reinforce what is argued in extant literature; DRW is 
directly and positively related to SRW. In other words, as the number of women in parliament 
increases, women‟s substantive representation increases. However, the results of the models 
using CIRI dataset dependent variables do show some support for the argument that political 
party institutions affect levels of SRW. When using women‟s economic and women‟s social 
rights as the main outcome variables, the percent of women in parliament is significant but so are 
the party power centralization measures of executive and legislative nomination. Modeling 
women‟s political rights, the ballot control measure is significant. The null hypothesis can be 
rejected. This is also true for one of the „traditional‟ measures of SRW, women‟s participation in 
the formal labor force. These models show significance for the party power centralization 
measure of ballot control.  
Table 23 
Long-run Multipliers 
% Women in Formal Labor Force 
  Model III Model V 
Ballot Control 6.6304**** 7.0606**** 
  (2.8047) (3.0509) 
  
 
  
% Women in Parliament 0.9725**** 0.9725**** 
  (0.4114) (0.4114) 
  
 
  
Years since Women Gained Right 
to Vote -0.2687** -0.2687** 
  -(0.1137) -(0.1168) 
p<.1*, p<.5**, p<.01***, p<.001**** 
Original Coefficients in Parentheses 
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Several conclusions may tentatively be made. First, using the CIRI indices as dependent 
variables in models of DRW and SRW in Latin America may be useful to researchers in the 
context of political party institutions. These variables are more reliable than the „traditional‟ 
dependent variables in terms of data collection. They also capture SRW more comprehensively 
than simple measures of school enrollment, fertility rates, or participation in the formal labor 
force as reflected in the findings of the models in section 4 of this chapter. Secondly, the 
significance attached to the party power centralization variables could support a theory of the 
marginalization, or tokenism, of women in Latin American legislatures. Women are getting 
elected at higher rates but may be taking a backseat in chambers as they displace male 
incumbents or hopefuls (Bih-er and Clark, 1990; Bratton, 2005; Goetz, 2003; Skard and Haavio-
Mannila, 1985; Tremblay, 2006). This happens as a result of often intense pressure being placed 
on party elite to open political ranks to female candidates (Bratton, 2005; Matland and Taylor, 
1997; Tremblay, 2006). If party power is centralized, the decision-making privileges lie with 
these elite who may decide to strategically give into these pressures and adopt women-friendly 
policies. Women, in turn, suffer the consequences of being an „unwanted presence‟ in the 
parliaments of Latin America. This is a jumping off point for further institutional analyses. While 
the assumption that DRW leads directly to SRW may not be dropped, this chapter provides some 
proof that party institutions may ultimately affect levels of substantive representation. 
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CHAPTER V: QUOTA LAWS AND WOMEN‟S SUBSTANTIVE REPRESENTATION 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Although quota laws are present in over 100 nations of the world, Latin America is 
unique in its rapid and extensive adoption of such policies (Schwindt-Bayer, 2010; Xydias, 
2010). Latin America‟s „vanguard‟ status, as Jones (2009) describes this leading position in 
quota law adoption, makes the area particularly interesting in the context of contemporary quota 
law studies. In the early 1990s Argentina becomes one of the first countries in the region to 
formally adopt quota laws aimed at increasing the number of women in the legislature 
(Franceschet and Piscopo, 2008; Gray, 2003). By 1993, Argentina uses these quotas during its 
national legislative elections, becoming the first country in history to do so (Jones, 2009). As of 
2010, more than half of Latin America‟s countries (nineteen) use gender quotas specifically 
designed to improve women‟s representation through either the election of female 
representatives to the legislature or in the election of women to other public offices (Inter-
American Development Bank, 2012). Thus far, it is widely accepted that quotas work as 
intended; there is a positive relationship between the number of women in parliament and the 
adoption of formal quota laws (Araujo and Garcia, 2006; Dahlerup, 2006; Franceschet and 
Piscopo, 2008; Jones, 2009; Kittilson, 2005; Mansbridge, 2005; Schmidt and Saunders, 2004). 
But does the adoption of gendered quota laws substantively improve the lives of women in Latin 
America?  
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The current literature on quota law institutions suggests that quota laws should make the 
political environment more permissive which, as argued in both Chapters III and IV, should 
increase levels of SRW (Krook, 2006). However, it is also argued that the level of 
permissiveness is dependent upon the type of quota law adopted and as well as other institutional 
arrangements.
22
 This argument is supported by the widely varying impact(s) of quota laws 
observed throughout Latin America (Tripp and Kang, 2008; Vincent, 2004; Xydias, 2007, 2010). 
As institutions within, and between, countries vary so too does the effectiveness of quota laws 
(as related to DRW). There is some evidence, for instance, that the adoption of voluntary party 
quotas is more effective at getting women elected to legislatures than are electoral quotas alone 
(Ballington and Matland, 2004; Schwindt-Bayer, 2009). The ability of parties, often the true 
centerpieces of elections, is a powerful tool for increasing DRW. The responsibility of 
nomination allows parties to strategically prepare and select candidates for election (Ballington 
and Matland, 2004). If, as discussed in previous sections of this work, parties are facing outside 
pressure to increase the number of women amongst their ranks, adopting quotas allows parties to 
improve nomination generally by placing women on the ballot. Electoral quota laws, while 
helpful, must include enforcement mechanisms, placement mandates, and other institutional 
caveats to ensure their effectiveness (Schwindt-Bayer, 2009). These differences in effectiveness 
may have an impact on levels of SRW and will be discussed in the following section. In sum, 
quota laws may affect the permissiveness of the political environment to varying degrees, 
                                                          
22
There are currently four common types of quota law: electoral, constitutional, voluntary party, and sub-national 
(Caul, 1999; Kenworthy and Malami, 1999; Lijphart, 1994). A government may decide to adopt any one, or some 
combination, of these four quota laws. However, it is generally argued that the success of these laws lies in the 
simultaneous existence of PR systems with closed-lists, placement mandates, and adequate compliance enforcement 
(as it relates to the use of quota laws) (Kenworthy and Malami, 1999; Matland, 1993). When these institutions do 
not exist alongside quota law adoption, the relationship between quota laws and DRW, thus the permissiveness of 
the political environment, is greatly reduced (Kenworthy and Malami, 1999).  
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depending upon a country‟s particular institutional context (Neto and Cox, 1997; Remmer, 
2008).  
 Therefore, ceteris paribus, extant literature predicts that researchers will find the 
following linear relationship: 
Quota Law AdoptionIncreased DRWIncreased SRW 
However, while much work has been done to determine the validity of the hypothetical 
relationship between quota laws and DRW, the relationship between DRW and SRW is taken as 
given (Beckwith, 2002; Celis and Childs, 2008; Celis et al., 2008; Childs, 2003; Paxton and 
Hughes, 2007). Increase DRW and increases in SRW will logically follow. Yet just as with the 
studies of electoral and party institutions, simply assuming that this relationship exists is not 
sufficient evidence upon which to rest generalizable conclusions. Furthermore, researchers are 
still unsure of whether or not quota laws encourage politicians to promote women‟s rights 
(Franheshet and Piscopo, 2008). Yes quota laws boost female legislative proportions, but do they 
affect levels of SRW (Laserud and Taphorn, 2007; Matland, 2005; Matland and Taylor 1997; 
Norris, 2004)?  
2. VARIABLES AND HYPOTHESES 
 A. DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
This chapter asks whether or not the introduction of quota laws creates a more or less 
permissive political environment that, in turn, measurably affects women‟s substantive 
representation. In order to answer this question, the same dependent variables used to model the 
relationship(s) between electoral institutions and SRW are used to model the relationship(s) 
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between Latin American party institutions and SRW. More precisely, the three CIRI variables 
(women‟s economic rights, women‟s social rights, and women‟s political rights) are used 
alongside the three traditional measures of SRW (women‟s enrollment in secondary education, 
women‟s fertility rates, and the % women in the formal labor force) to investigate what effect, if 
any, quota laws have on SRW. Using identical variables across the models in all three empirical 
chapters is justified by the desire to compare and generalize any meaningful results. Essentially 
the same question is being asked throughout the dissertation; do a particular set of institutions, in 
this case quota law institutions, affect SRW? Thus, the variables that are appropriate for Chapters 
III and IV are also appropriate for the analyses in Chapter V.
23
  
 B. INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
Lower House Electoral Quota Laws   
 In order to make a meaningful contribution to the literature on quota laws and SRW, a 
simple set of independent variables is used alongside important control variables. The adoption 
of lower house electoral quotas or the adoption of voluntary party quotas are chosen as the two 
most potentially informative categories of quota law institutions out of the four categories 
available for analysis.
24
 While each type of quota law may have some impact on DRW, the 
likelihood of reciprocal relationships makes separately examining variables such as 
constitutional quota laws and lower house electoral quota laws obsolete. By nature, the adoption 
of lower house electoral quotas is constitutionally mandated (Htun and Jones 2002). Thus, a 
lower house quota law is also a constitutional quota law. It is also important to note that 
                                                          
23
 For a complete discussion of the dependent variables used in this chapter‟s analyses, including the source(s) from 
which they are drawn, the exact definitions adopted, and the assumptions made about their use, please refer to 
Chapter III, Section 2, Subheading A of this dissertation. 
24
 The remaining two categories, also listed in Section 1, footnote 2 of this chapter are 1) constitutional quota laws 
and 2) sub-national quota laws.  
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constitutional quota laws, as a separate category of laws, comprises quotas whose adoption is 
mandatory for both the upper and lower houses of the legislature in bicameral systems (Jones 
and Navia, 1999). This dissertation focuses solely on the lower house of legislatures, as do the 
majority of other studies of the topic of SRW (Beckwith, 2002; Celis and Childs, 2008; Celis et 
al., 2008; Childs, 2003; Paxton and Hughes, 2007). Because of these particular traits, the 
category of constitutional quotas is omitted to ensure that the adoption of electoral quotas is only 
present in the lower legislative chamber and that two highly correlated variables
25
 are not 
included in the same study. Accordingly, the variable Electoral Quota Laws (idea_elq) is used in 
the institutional analyses of this chapter. This variable is a dummy variable equaling one if 
quotas for women are provided for in election laws or other relevant laws as they pertain to the 
lower house of the legislature, and zero if otherwise. The data are taken from the Quota Project, 
kept by the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (2010).  
 Theoretically, electoral quota laws aimed at increasing the number of women in the 
legislature may be viewed unfavorably in the traditional patriarchal societies of Latin America 
(Craske, 1999). The displacement of male candidates, if it occurs, may lead to resentment, 
especially when this displacement is constitutionally mandated (Heath et al., 2005). However, 
the overall discontent with the adoption of such policies may again simply lie in the long-
standing social customs prevalent throughout Latin America; men occupy the public sphere 
while women occupy the private sphere (Chant and Craske, 2003; Schwindt-Bayer, 2010).
26
 
Adjusting to the equalization of these male/female roles in Latin America may take time and in 
                                                          
25
 The correlation coefficient for constitutional quotas (idea_cq) and electoral quotas (idea_elq) is 0.662.  
26
 For a full discussion of this theory, please see Chapter II, Section 2, Subheading “Women‟s Role in Contemporary 
Latin American Society”, beginning on page 12 of this dissertation.  
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the short term negatively impact women‟s substantive representation as the sex proportions in 
parliament are in flux. Thus:  
H12: The adoption of lower house electoral quota laws decreases SRW.  
Voluntary Party Quota Laws  
Similarly, sub-national quota laws are also excluded from the analyses in this chapter. 
Instead, a variable capturing the voluntary adoption of quotas by parties is included. The reason 
for this omission lies in an argument of pragmatism. For the purposes of this project, there is 
much more useful information that may be obtained by comparing the outcomes of voluntary 
quota adoption by parties across countries than by looking at the adoption of quota laws for sub-
national elections. The main impetus for this deletion is supported by the difficulty of making 
comparisons across countries with widely varying federal systems. The Latin American region 
contains countries with highly federal systems, such as Mexico and Brazil, but it also includes 
unitary states, such as Chile, Honduras, and Bolivia, as well as states with mixed systems, such 
as Venezuela. Not only are there subtle differences in these systems that may be difficult to 
control for, but typically sub-national quota laws are also constitutionally mandated.  
In contrast, the voluntary adoption of quotas by political parties is comparable across 
party systems and contains more interesting information that the other two deleted categories 
(Araujo and Garcia, 2006; Baldez, 2004). Because the party elite control party policy, it is 
reasonable to assume that voluntary party quotas are mandated by those at the top (Caul, 2001; 
Frechette et al., 2008). If the party elite mandate gendered quotas, there is a reasonable chance 
that they will do so with or without the explicit support of rank and file party members (Caul, 
2001; Jones, 2002). This, as noted in the previous chapter, can lead to the marginalization of 
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women elected to the legislature as male incumbents or hopefuls may feel displaced by these 
laws (Bratton, 2005; Kaiser, 2001; Frechette et al., 2009; Kathlene, 1994; Norris and 
Lovenduski, 2001; Pande and Ford, 2011; Paxton and Hughes, 2007). If women are 
marginalized, it may mean that their presence may not lead to their active participation 
(Reingold, 2006; Reynolds, 1999). Thus, the adoption of voluntary party quotas may affect 
SRW.  The variable used, idea_ppq, is also a dummy variable which equals one if there exists 
rules or targets set by political parties to include a certain percentage of women as election 
candidates and zero if otherwise. It should be noted that this does not include quotas for internal 
party structures (Quota Project, 2010). It follows that:   
H13: The voluntary adoption of quota laws by political parties decreases SRW.  
3. DATA AND METHODS  
 The approach to data analyses is uniform across all three of this work‟s empirical 
chapters. The data used in this particular chapter comprises five dependent variables, two 
independent variables, and four control variables, which are introduced in the section 
immediately preceding this one. Again, eighteen countries across Central and South America and 
the Caribbean are evaluated over a twenty year time span (1990-2010). The use of this limited 
time frame is explicated in Chapter III, Section 3, as is the justification for this project‟s focus on 
the Latin American region. As a reminder, the first three dependent variables are all taken from 
the Cingranelli and Richards Human Rights dataset (2010) and are ciri_wecon, ciri_wosoc, and 
ciri_wopol. Each, as described above, is an index that captures the level of women‟s economic, 
social, and political rights, respectively. The other three dependent variables are taken from 
various sources. Edenroll captures the percentage of women‟s enrollment in secondary education 
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as compared to men‟s (UNESCO Institute for Statistics, 2010). The measure of women‟s fertility 
rate, wdi_fr, is taken from The World Development Indicators Catalogue and represents the 
number of children that would be born to a woman if she were to live to the end of her childbearing 
years and produce children in accordance with current age-specific fertility rates. Lastly, the labor 
measurement, w_labor, was created using statistics from the World Development Indicators 
Catalogue, and represents the total number of women employed in the formal labor sector, as 
compared to men. The first step to evaluating the quota law data is to use a simple linear 
regression model. Each key explanatory variable is regressed on each dependent variable using 
simple linear regression with heteroskedastic consistent standard errors (Huber-White standard 
errors), clustered by country to account for the panel component of the data. The preliminary 
effects are then examined. However, the coefficients found using the simple OLS model are 
likely to be both inefficient, due to large standard errors, and biased. This is reinforced by the 
amount of missing data that exist across the variables and across time. Thus, the results obtained 
using OLS are unreliable, as the method is generally inappropriate for this data set. 
Again, because of the incomplete nature of the data used across the three empirical 
chapters, it is advised that a multiple imputation method is used to account for autocorrelation 
over time (see De Boef and Keele, 2008; Gelman et al., 1998; King et al., 2001). Autocorrelation 
is likely to exist in the data due to the multiple missing observations. The multiple imputations 
are run using the ICE package for Stata using those independent variables without missing data 
as predictors. The following results presented are for an autoregressive panel model using ten 
imputed datasets. The autocorrelation is accounted for with the lagged dependent variable and 
heteroskedasticity is accounted for with a random intercept.  
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Models with interactive terms are included because of the possibility of multiple 
interactive effects among the electoral institutions. These models use the same methods as above 
but include an interactive term alongside the singular, interacted variables. Additionally, as many 
of the data used in this project take time to show significant change, such as education 
enrollment and the percentage of women in the workforce, the long-run multiplier of the 
coefficient is calculated for indicators that attain statistical significance. This is done in order to 
evaluate the strength of the statistical relationship against the theoretical argument. The long-run 
multipliers show the full effect of a change in x on the dependent variables, not just the 
instantaneous change (De Boef and Keele, 2008). Using the formula from Williams and Whitten 
the LRM is calculated. This is simply (coefficient/[1-lag of the DV]). The following tables report 
the results of the regressed models and the long-run multipliers for significant coefficients.
27
 
28
 
4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
CIRI Variables 
 Similar to the results found in the two preceding chapters, the results reported in this 
chapter show mixed support for the hypothesized relationships. Beginning with the dependent 
variables taken from the CIRI dataset, the adoption of either electoral quota laws or voluntary 
quota laws, or the adoption of both quota types, is negatively related to women‟s economic rights 
across all three models of the dependent variable. While this is the hypothesized relationship 
between the dependent and independent variable(s), none of the coefficients are significant. In 
Model I, only the number of women in parliament is significantly related to women‟s economic 
                                                          
27
 GDP per capita is not included in the calculation of the long-run multipliers.  
28
 The natural log of GDP per capita is calculated and each model is run with this control variable. Subsequently 
each model is run with the simple measure of GDP per capita. There is almost no difference in results between the 
two variables. I chose to report the models which use the simple measure of GDP per capita.  
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rights. The simple interpretation of this result is that as the number of women in parliament 
increases, women‟s economic rights increase. In this model, electoral quota laws do not appear 
to affect SRW. In fact, descriptive representation is the only significant predictor of women‟s 
substantive representation in Model. I.  
Table 24 
Regression Models of Women's Economic Rights 
  Model I Model II Model III 
_lag 0.5342**** 0.5238**** 0.5176**** 
  (0.0554) (0.0563) (0.0569) 
  
  
  
Electoral Quota 
Laws -0.0309 
 
-0.0796 
  (0.0539) 
 
(0.0590) 
  
  
  
Voluntary Party 
Quota Laws 
 
-0.0665 -0.1009* 
  
 
(0.0518) (0.0568) 
  
  
  
% Women in 
Parliament 0.0058* 0.0057 0.0064 
  (0.0034) (0.0033) (0.0034) 
  
  
  
Years since Women 
Gained Right to 
Vote 0.0036 0.0044* 0.0047* 
  (0.0028) (0.0029) (0.0029) 
  
  
  
Freedom House 
Score 0.0041 0.0069 0.0125 
  (0.0196) (0.0201) (0.0204) 
  
  
  
GDP per Capita 0.0000 0.0000* 0.0000* 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
  
  
  
Constant -6.6327 -8.2333 -8.7484* 
  (5.6530) (5.8324) (5.8451) 
p<.1*, p<.05**, p<.01***, p<.001**** 
 
However, the DRW measure is only significant at the .1 level and the coefficient is relatively 
small (.0058) but it still supports the current literature‟s predictions. The null hypothesis cannot 
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be rejected for this model and there may be no relationship between electoral quota laws and 
women‟s economic rights. 
In Model II, only two of the control variables are significant. Women‟s suffrage is 
positive and significant at the .1 level, as is GDP per capita. Again, the key explanatory variable, 
voluntary party quota laws, is insignificant. This suggests that the longer women have had the 
right to participate in politics and the more developed a country is, the better are women‟s 
economic rights. Theoretically, this may be expected. When the significance of the control 
variables is considered, the story explaining women‟s rights becomes one of a country‟s overall 
modernization rather than the potential effects of institutions on SRW.
29
 The more modernized is 
a nation, the more likely it is that all of its citizens are flourishing economically (Norris and 
Inglehart, 2001). What cannot be discerned from this model is how women‟s economic rights 
compare to those of male citizens. The increased economic rights for women may simply be a 
side-effect of increased economic rights for all citizens as a country‟s level of modernization 
increases. Thus, this finding could rest on the argument that it is not the number of women in 
parliament or the adoption of quota laws, but a country‟s level of modernization, that dictates 
women‟s economic rights in Latin America.  
The full model run on women‟s economic rights, Model III, shows significance for 
voluntary party quota laws (negative at the .1 level). Again the two control variables, women‟s 
suffrage and GDP per capita, are positive and significant at p<.1. While the coefficient is 
relatively small (-0.1009) the relationship is in the expected direction; controlling for women‟s 
suffrage and GDP per capita, the presence of voluntary party quota laws is negatively related to 
                                                          
29
 The modernization of a nation is linked to its social progress and general economic development, which are 
believed to move a country out of a „traditional‟ society and into a „modern society‟. For a full discussion of 
modernization and its implications, please see Norris and Inglehart, 2001.  
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women‟s economic rights. Theoretically, this is based on the same argument undergirding the 
negative relationship between SRW and increasing levels of party power centralization discussed 
in the preceding chapter. The concentration of decision-making powers in the hands of the elite 
may lead either directly, or indirectly, to the displacement of male candidates and/or party 
members. This can cause the marginalization and tokenism of women within the political 
process, especially within the legislative chambers (Heath et al., 2005; Htun and Jones, 2002; 
Reingold, 2006). While more work needs to be done to model this theoretical relationship it is an 
area of research that is growing, especially as it relates to women‟s substantive representation in 
Latin America (Reingold, 2006). 
Similar to the results found with the previous dependent variable, there is little 
significance in the models employing women‟s social rights as the measure of SRW (please see 
Table 25 on the following page). Across all three models, only the control variables women‟s 
suffrage and GDP per capita are positive and significant at the .05 and .01 levels, respectively. 
That is to say, the null hypotheses cannot be rejected; there may be no relationship between 
women‟s social rights and quota law institutions. Instead, women‟s suffrage and the level of a 
country‟s development are the best predictors of improved substantive representation for women. 
These findings generally support what is posited in extant literature. The measures of 
modernization appear to be better predictors of the social rights of women in Latin American 
society than does the adoption of quota laws, at least in the models presented here.  
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Table 25 
Regression Models of Women's Social Rights 
  Model I Model II Model III 
_lag 0.4592**** 0.4559**** 0.4556**** 
  (0.0585) (0.0576) (0.0575) 
  
  
  
Electoral Quota Laws 0.0207 
 
-0.0002 
  (0.0586) 
 
(0.0634) 
  
  
  
Voluntary Party Quota Laws 
 
-0.0440 -0.0441 
  
 
(0.0554) 0.0599 
  
  
  
% Women in Parliament 0.0054 0.0057 0.0057 
  (0.0041) (0.0040) (0.0041) 
  
  
  
Years since Women Gained 
Right to Vote 0.0070** 0.0075** 0.0075** 
  (0.0034) (0.0033) (0.0034) 
  
  
  
Freedom House Score 0.0049 0.0086 0.0086 
  (0.0210) (0.0208) (0.0213) 
  
  
  
GDP per Capita 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
  
  
  
Constant -13.2893 -14.1891 -14.2003 
  (6.6882) (6.6390) (6.6737) 
p<.1*, p<.05**, p<.01***, p<.001**** 
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When political rights are introduced as the dependent measure of SRW, the findings 
become more interesting (see Table 26 on the following page). One of the control variables is 
significant across all three models; GDP per capita is positive and significant (Model I p<.01, 
Models  II and III p<.05). There is no significance reported for the key explanatory variable in 
Model I (electoral quota laws) and the logical conclusion is that all else being equal, the 
adoption of electoral quota laws does not affect women‟s political rights. However, in Models 
II and III, the adoption of voluntary party quotas is significantly related to women‟s political 
rights but the direction of the relationship is not as hypothesized. The independent variable is 
positively related to women‟s political rights suggesting that the adoption of voluntary party 
quotas increases SRW. These findings lend further support to the current literature on 
women‟s representation. There is a positive, linear relationship between DRW and SRW. 
Theoretically it suggests that the presence of quota laws increases the ability of female, or 
male, legislators to introduce legislation that substantively improves the lives of Latin 
American women. Again while this finding is unexpected, it is valuable. The current theories 
of the relationship between DRW and SRW may be correct.  
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Table 26 
Regression Models of Women's Political Rights 
  Model I Model II Model III 
_lag 0.5160**** 0.5070**** 0.5057**** 
  (0.0533) (0.0531) (0.0531) 
  
  
  
Electoral Quota Laws -0.0118 
 
0.0147 
  (0.0309) 
 
(0.0342) 
  
  
  
Voluntary Party Quota Laws 
 
0.0520* 0.0581* 
  
 
(0.0301) (0.0335) 
Years since Women Gained 
Right to Vote 0.0016 0.0011 0.0011 
  (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0016) 
  
  
  
Freedom House Score -0.0098 -0.0151 -0.0141 
  (0.0139) (0.0134) (0.0137) 
  
  
  
GDP per Capita 0.0000*** 0.0000** 0.0000** 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
  
  
  
Constant -2.3175 -1.2631 -1.3403 
  (3.2670) (3.2716) (3.2877) 
p<.1*, p<.05**, p<.01***, p<.001**** 
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Traditional Variables 
Turning to the measures traditionally used to proxy SRW, the findings here are similar to 
those of the previous two chapters. This is especially true as it relates to the measure of women‟s 
secondary school enrollment. The following table presents these results.  
Table 27 
Regression Models Women's Enrollment in Secondary Education 
  Model I Model II Model III 
_lag 0.7311**** 0.7309**** 0.7309**** 
  (0.0420) (0.0421) (0.0422) 
  
  
  
Electoral Quota Laws 0.0003 
 
0.0001 
  (0.0067) 
 
(0.0075) 
  
  
  
Voluntary Party Quota Laws 
 
-0.0004 -0.0003 
  
 
(0.0062) (0.0070) 
  
  
  
% Women in Parliament -0.0067 -0.0006* -0.0006* 
  (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
  
  
  
Years since Women Gained 
Right to Vote 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
  (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0000) 
  
  
  
Freedom House Score 0.0016 0.0016 0.0016 
  (0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0025) 
  
  
  
GDP per Capita 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
  
  
  
Constant 0.2064 0.1991 0.2000 
  (0.6905) (0.7033) (0.7058) 
p<.1*, p<.05**, p<.01***, p<.001**** 
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The only significant variable is the control for the percent of women in parliament in 
Models II and III. The number of women in parliament is significant at the .1 level but is 
negatively related to women‟s secondary school enrollment. This finding is of little consequence 
and the likely explanation for the negative relationship is simple. There has not been enough time 
since women have entered parliament to see meaningful increases in women‟s enrollment in 
secondary education. Typically, measures of education such as literacy rate or grade-level 
subject proficiency change at a glacial pace (Craske, 1999; Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler, 2005; 
Schwindt-Bayer, 2010). Data on these variables tend to be measured in ten-year periods to allow 
for such changes to manifest. Because quota laws are implemented throughout the 1990s and this 
study uses the years 1990-2010 for evaluation, it may be too early to see the relationship between 
quota law adoption and education enrollment manifest. Again, the null hypotheses cannot be 
rejected and the minimal findings may not provide researchers with further insight into the 
theoretical efficacy of institutional mitigation or of the direct relationship between DRW and 
SRW. 
The results of the three women‟s fertility rate models are also sparse, as only the percent 
of women in parliament is significant.  This variable is negatively related to women‟s fertility 
rate at the .1 level. As the number of women in parliament increases, women‟s fertility rates 
decrease. Low fertility rates are seen as indicators improved quality of life for women (Craske, 
1999). This is reflected in the high birthrates recorded for women in many developing countries 
and is attributed to poor access to education, contraception, and medical care (Craske, 1999; 
Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler, 2005; Schwindt-Bayer, 2010; Xydias, 2010). Again, the findings 
here, while basic, support the literature. There appears to be no relationship between women‟s 
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fertility rates and the adoption of quota laws when controlling for the number of women in 
parliament.  
 
Table 28 
Regression Models Women's Fertility  Rates 
  Model I Model II Model III 
_lag 0.9628**** 0.9649**** 0.9652**** 
  (0.0136) (0.0139) (0.0139) 
  
  
  
Electoral Quota Laws 0.0161 
 
0.0094 
  (0.0157) 
 
(0.0174) 
  
  
  
Voluntary Party Quota Laws 
 
-0.0187 -0.0148 
  
 
(0.0149) (0.0166) 
  
  
  
% Women in Parliament -0.0018* -0.0017* -0.0018* 
  (0.0010) (0.0009) (0.0010) 
  
  
  
Years since Women Gained 
Right to Vote -0.0005 -0.0003 -0.0003 
  (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) 
  
  
  
Freedom House Score -0.0040 -0.0020 -0.0026 
  (0.0051) (0.0052) (0.0054) 
  
  
  
GDP per Capita 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
  
  
  
Constant 1.0592 0.7838 0.8408 
  (1.6861) (1.6952) (1.6997) 
p<.1*, p<.05**, p<.01***, p<.001**** 
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In contrast, there is some evidence that quota law institutions do affect levels of SRW in 
the models of women in the formal labor force.  
Table 29 
Regression Models of % Women in Formal Labor Force 
  Model I Model II Model III 
_lag 0.6182**** 0.6049**** 0.5998**** 
  (0.0825) (0.0819) (0.0806) 
  
  
  
Electoral Quota 
Laws 1.4872* 
 
0.5705 
  (0.9101) 
 
(1.0453) 
  
  
  
Voluntary Party 
Quota Laws 
 
-2.2945*** -2.0806** 
  
 
(0.8001) (0.8001) 
  
  
  
% Women in 
Parliament 0.3154 0.3348**** 0.3315**** 
  (0.0840) (0.0835) (0.0852) 
  
  
  
Years since Women 
Gained Right to Vote -0.1256** -0.1081* -0.1108* 
  (0.0571) (0.0573) (0.0570) 
  
  
  
Freedom House 
Score -0.5503* -0.3610 -0.4054 
  (0.2960) (0.3035) (0.3099) 
  
  
  
GDP per Capita -0.0001 -0.0000 -0.0000 
  (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
  
  
  
Constant 260.2800 226.5950** 232.0340** 
  (113.5630) (113.9070) (113.1670) 
p<.1*, p<.05**, p<.01***, p<.001**** 
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Model I reports electoral quota laws as significant at the .1 level, though the direction of the 
relationship is not as hypothesized. Controlling for other factors, the adoption of electoral quota 
laws increases the percent of women in the formal labor force. The key independent variable in 
Model II, adoption of party quotas, is also significant (p<.01) and in the expected direction. Here, 
the interpretation is: all else being equal, the adoption of voluntary party quotas decreases the 
percent of women in the formal labor force. In other words, the adoption of party quotas 
decreases SRW. The full model, Model III, also supports the hypothesized relationship. When 
both explanatory variables are included in model, controlling for possible intervening variables, 
the adoption of voluntary party quota laws retains significance (negative at p<.05). Thus, the 
presence of voluntary quotas may have a greater impact on the relationship between DRW and 
SRW than does the adoption of electoral quota laws. The likelihood of marginalization for 
female legislators, preventing an increase in women-specific legislation, may increase when 
party members feel that they are being displaced by their „own‟ rather than by a centralized, 
political entity that is in no way connected to the party‟s organization. Regardless of the exact 
underlying mechanism, these models show support for the theory that institutions affect SRW 
rather than upholding what is accepted in the current literature.  
 As a final note, none of the interactive models or the models with regional controls 
(Central America, South America, and Mexico) produce any significant findings. The long run 
multipliers calculated for the significant coefficients are in the tables that follow. The reported 
LRMs do show a strengthening of the relationships over time but do not produce unexpected or 
remarkable results that call for new, or further, interpretation of the findings.  
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Table 30 
Long-run Multipliers 
Women's Economic Rights 
  Model IV 
Voluntary Party 
Quotas -0.2091* 
  (-0.1009) 
    
Women's 
Suffrage 0.0097* 
  (0.0047) 
p<.1*, p<.5**, p<.01***, p<.001**** 
Original Coefficients in Parentheses 
 
 
 
Table 31 
Long-run Multipliers 
Women's Political Rights 
  Model III Model IV 
Voluntary Party Quotas 0.1306** 0.1459* 
  (0.0520) (0.0581) 
  
 
  
p<.1*, p<.5**, p<.01***, p<.001**** 
Original Coefficients in Parentheses 
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Table 32 
Long-run Multipliers 
% Women in Formal Labor Force 
  Model I Model II Model III 
  
  
  
Electoral Quota Laws 3.8952* 
 
  
  (1.4872) 
 
  
  
  
  
Voluntary Party 
Quotas 
 
-5.6821*** -5.1989** 
  
 
-(2.2450) -(2.0806) 
  
  
  
% Women in 
Parliament 
 
0.8473**** 0.8283**** 
  
 
(0.3348) (0.3315) 
  
  
  
Women's Suffrage -0.3289** -0.2807* -0.2768* 
  -(0.1256) -(0.1081) -(0.1108) 
  
  
  
Freedom House -1.4413* 
 
  
  -0.5503     
p<.1*, p<.5**, p<.01***, p<.001**** 
Original Coefficients in Parentheses 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 Gendered quota laws have become an ever-present feature of Latin America‟s political 
landscape. While it is clear that these laws get more women elected to legislatures, depending 
upon certain institutional factors, it is not clear that quotas improve the lives of women more 
generally (Araujo and Garcia, 2006; Dahlerup, 2006; Franceschet and Piscopo, 2008; Jones, 
2009; Kittilson, 2005; Mansbridge, 2005; Schmidt and Saunders, 2004). The purpose of this 
chapter‟s empirical analyses was to discover whether or not quota laws do indeed affect 
women‟s lives beyond the achievement of descriptive representation. The majority of the 
findings tend to support the current literature‟s assertion that while institutions may create a more 
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or less permissive environment for the election of women, they do not significantly impact 
women‟s substantive representation. That, the literature claims, is the entirely the work of 
women‟s increased legislative presence. 
 However, several of the models show that there may be something to the institutional 
story. Specifically, the adoption of voluntary party quotas is positively related to women‟s 
political rights, when controlling for potential intervening factors. The adoption of electoral 
quota laws is also positively related to the percentage of women in the formal labor force while 
the adoption of voluntary party quotas appears to decrease the percentage of women in the 
formal labor force, ceteris paribus. While these are not prolific results, they do suggest that 
researchers should delve deeper into the theoretical explanation for the relationships reported 
between these variables. Thus, the overall conclusion is that the current literature is correct but it 
should also be re-evaluated as more time since the adoption of quota laws lapses and as more 
reliable data is archived on the dependent variables evaluated here. Not all of the null hypotheses 
can be rejected; in some instances quota law institutions do appear to affect SRW. Delving 
further into the possible theoretical explanation with improved empirics should provide 
researchers with more definitive answers on the question at hand.
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CHAPTER VI: CONCLUSION 
1.INTRODUCTION 
The principal concern of this dissertation has been to provide insight into the relationship 
between the descriptive and the substantive representation of women in Latin America. A long 
literature on this subject has been developed throughout the twentieth century and is picking up 
momentum as the twenty-first century continues to move forward (Beckwith, 2002; Celis and 
Childs, 2008; Pitkin, 1967; Reingold, 2006; Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler, 2005; Schwindt-
Bayer, 2010). The accelerated interest in this topic may be traced back to several sources. First, 
the number of women in most Latin American parliaments has nearly doubled over the past two 
decades (IPU, 2013). This increase in women‟s political presence, while not singular to the 
region, is virtually unparalleled in its swiftness and thoroughness (Htun and Jones, 2002). 
Secondly, women are not only entering into Latin American parliaments in larger numbers, but 
they are also capturing higher ranking political posts such as governorships in Mexico and 
presidencies in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, and Nicaragua (CIA World Leader‟s 
Database, 2010). Women are also becoming more prominent within parties, as leaders scramble 
to include more female co-partisans, not just within the ranks but as elected representatives 
through quota law introduction (Araujo and Garcia, 2006; Costa Benavides, 2003; Dahlerup, 
2006; Franceschet and Piscopo, 2008; Jones, 2009). The combination of these factors leads 
scholars to an interesting question; what impact, if any, has the historically high number of 
women in Latin American politics had? More specifically, scholars ask whether or not 
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the increase in descriptive representation has improved women‟s substantive representation. The 
entirety of this dissertation is dedicated to helping solve this puzzle.   
 There is good reason for this effort, as solving the puzzle may have extremely important 
implications for policymakers in Latin America. As a group, women constitute the poorest 
citizens in the world, making them more susceptible to illness, death, and exploitation (United 
Nations Gender Statistics, 2012). This may not only burden an already struggling regional 
infrastructure but it also creates wide social and economic inequities between the sexes (Bih-er 
and Clark, 1990; Chaney, 1979; Jaquette and Wolchik, 1998; Johnson, 2002; Lyn, 1997). These 
inequities may translate into difficulty consolidating democracy, as the very nature of the 
democratic process demands rule by the majority (Jaquette and Wolchik, 1998; Mill, 1989; 
Young, 2002). The exclusion or marginalization of women‟s voices results in the loss of half of 
the population‟s input, meaning that a minority of citizens make the majority of decisions. With 
a past checkered with periods of brutal authoritarian rule, military coups, and semi-democratic 
regimes, the success of Third Wave democracies in Latin America may depend upon the further 
enfranchisement of women into the democratic process (Lyn, 1997). Aside from the desire to be 
free from oppressive political regimes, the correlation between higher levels of economic success 
and democracy may be pushing many countries to fight for democratic consolidation (Norris and 
Inglehart, 2001).  
 Recognizing the significance of this connection between women‟s participation and 
democratic success in Latin America, scholars struggle to uncover the mechanisms which could 
improve women‟s representation and, thus, secure a brighter future for democracies in the region 
(Chaney, 1979; Chant and Craske, 2003; Craske, 1999). However, these scholars are working 
with assumptions and findings that have come from a literature long dominated by studies of 
 117 
Western, industrialized democracies. In fact, the literature is filled with findings based on studies 
of the substantive outcomes of increased political inclusion of women in Western Europe and the 
United States (see: Beckwith, 2000, 2002; Bystydzienski, 1992; Lovenduski and Norris, 2004; 
Marsh and Wessels, 1997; Matland and Studlar, 1996; Petra, 2000). Overall, this literature 
suggests that there is a direct relationship between descriptive and substantive representation. 
Get more women elected to parliament and women‟s lives will improve across a variety of 
measures. These measures most commonly include women‟s enrollment in secondary education, 
the number of women participating in the formal labor force, female fertility rates, and maternal 
mortality rates (Celis et al., 2008; Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler, 2005; Schwindt-Bayer, 2010). 
These variables aim to capture both the health and socioeconomic characteristics of women, as a 
distinct population, in order to measure their quality of life over time (Celis et al., 2008; 
Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler, 2005; Schwindt-Bayer, 2006, 2010).  
 However, the differences between developed and less developed nations should not be 
ignored if researchers wish to generalize the results found from these studies for policy 
recommendations. It is important, then, that scholars study the relationship between DRW and 
SRW across both categories of countries in order to make comparisons. What‟s further, studying 
specific regions also provides important cultural controls. The decision to focus the analyses on 
Latin America is justified by the widespread presence of democracy, the social domination of the 
Catholic Church, the common colonial history, a larger sample size than available in some other 
regions (such as Eastern Europe or South Eastern Asia), and the Spanish language (excepting 
Brazil). There is also enough institutional variation across the countries of Latin America to 
allow researchers to compare and contrast outcomes. From a normative standpoint, these 
advantages will allow comparative political scientists to build upon a set of findings that can 
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inform analyses in other developing regions. It will also allow researchers to discern whether the 
direct relationship between DRW and SRW holds across democracies of all types or if it is a 
phenomenon specific to developed nations. Both of these contributions have the potential to 
affect the course of research on women‟s representation.  
2. FINDINGS 
 Generally, the findings across each of the empirical chapters of this dissertation support 
the findings in extant literature. When controlling for DRW, the presence of particular electoral 
institutions, party institutions, and quota laws has little, if any, affect on levels of SRW. It seems 
that the conclusions drawn from studies of Western, industrialized democracies are also 
applicable to the developing countries of Latin America: more women in the legislature means 
higher levels of substantive representation. This is one of the important contributions of this 
work. A second contribution lies in the results produced when using the CIRI dependent 
variables in place of what have been called the traditional dependent variables in studies of DRW 
and SRW. Some of the findings suggest that these variables are better measures of women‟s 
substantive representation and should be given more serious consideration in future studies.  
 As one begins to evaluate the findings across the three empirical chapters contained 
within this work, the lack of support for the institutional hypotheses makes clear that 1) women 
must be present in parliament for levels of SRW to increase (or improve) but 2) there is a 
missing link between the level of DRW and real-world policy outcomes for women that is not 
accounted for in this work. Without producing statistical evidence to the contrary, these findings 
only reinforce the DRWSRW theory. This does not imply, however, that researchers must 
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accept that this relationship is as clear cut as the literature posits. A brief overview of some of 
this dissertation‟s main empirical findings highlights this important fact. 
 In general the findings, again, support the literature; none of the institutional categories 
(electoral, party, or quota laws) have a substantial impact on SRW when controlling for measures 
of DRW and GDP per capita. There is little support found for the institutional hypotheses, when 
regressing on measures of women‟s enrollment in secondary education, women‟s fertility rates, 
and the percent of women in the formal labor force (the traditional dependent variables). The 
story is somewhat similar across the CIRI measures of SRW (women‟s economic, social, and 
political rights, respectively), as the results that support rejection of the null hypotheses of no 
relationship are sporadic rather than consistent. In summary, while some support for the 
institutional hypotheses is found it is intermittent and does not manifest in any recognizable trend 
across the empirical work. 
For instance, the findings of the models of women‟s political rights in Chapter III support 
the hypothesis that electoral systems which encourage candidates to run on highly personal 
platforms erode SRW. The finding is the same for vote thresholds; the higher a vote threshold 
requirement set through electoral laws, the larger the negative effect on women‟s political rights. 
Vote threshold is also negatively related to SRW when looking at women‟s fertility rates; as vote 
threshold requirements increase, SRW decreases. All of these findings are generated while 
controlling for DRW and GDP per capita.
30
 Although these results are not replicated on the other 
two CIRI measures of SRW in Chapter III, increased vote thresholds and high levels of 
legislative fractionalization negatively affect SRW in models of secondary education enrollment, 
                                                          
30
 The other two control variables across all of the empirical models are Freedom House Score and Women‟s 
Suffrage. 
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ceteris paribus. Oddly, the number of women in formal labor seems to increase as the incentive 
for a personal vote increases.   
In Chapter IV, the three party power centralization measures are shown to be detrimental 
to SRW across each of the CIRI measures of women‟s economic rights, women‟s social rights, 
and women‟s political rights. The preliminary conclusion is that when controlling for other 
factors, party power centralization may negatively affect SRW. On the other hand, only one of 
the party power centralization measures, Ballot Control, is significant in any of the models using 
traditional measures of SRW (in this case the percent of women in the formal labor force). But 
the findings are contrary to the predicted relationship; ballot control increases the number of 
women in the formal labor force. Thus, while there are a few significant results surrounding 
measures of party power centralization, the majority of the explanatory heft still lies in the 
control variables.  
Findings of interest across the models of Chapter V are even fewer and farther between. 
In fact, the measure of DRW (percent of women in parliament) is about the single significant 
factor across all six dependent variables. Only the voluntary quota law measure shows much 
movement, being significantly related to measures of women‟s economic rights, political rights, 
and the percent of women in the formal labor force. However, while this measure is positively 
related to SRW in models of women‟s political rights, it is negatively related to SRW in models 
of women‟s economic rights and in models of the percent of women in the formal labor force. 
The contradictory findings across the two CIRI measures are difficult to understand, as both 
variables comprise similar SRW outcomes. It is also worth noting that while electoral quota laws 
are significantly related to the percent of women in the formal labor force, the sign contradicts 
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the predicted relationship. In sum, quota laws may affect SRW but the findings presented in 
Chapter V do not help to substantially clarify the mechanism underlying this relationship.  
 The main empirical results reported across the three previous chapters may not lead 
researchers to believe that electoral, party, and quota law institutions significantly affect SRW. 
The idea that the permissiveness of the electoral environment improves SRW still seems to lie in 
its simple ability to increase the number of women in parliament. However, there are lingering 
institutions that are not explicitly accounted for in the models but are controlled for by region. 
Those are the cultural institutions of Latin America. The value of the findings of this dissertation 
does not lie in its ability to solve the theoretical puzzle in its entirety. Instead, what is suggested 
by the overall failure to reject the null hypotheses is that researchers should narrow their focus 
onto how cultural contexts affect the relationship between DRW and SRW. The institutional 
setting may become inconsequential after some general level of electoral permissiveness is 
reached (such as the implementation of quota laws and the use of enforcement mechanisms in 
open-list, PR systems). From there, it is important to look to other theoretical explanations for 
the generally low levels of SRW in Latin America despite the significant increases in DRW 
across the region. 
3. AVENUES FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
 The discussion above emphasizes the idea that there may be a missing link between 
DRW and SRW that we have yet to uncover. However, a burgeoning area of research that may 
offer some insight on this topic is legislative marginalization. Specifically, it is argued that the 
reaction of male politicians to rising DRW may be one of self preservation (Heath et al., 2005). 
An influx of women into the male sphere could be seen as a threat to the position(s) once 
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exclusively reserved for, and occupied by, men. The seats that women win may be perceived by 
men to be rightfully „theirs‟. As a result, researchers have found a tendency for female legislators 
to be marginalized within legislative chambers (Bih-er and Clark, 1990; Heath et al., 2005; Skard 
and Haavio-Mannila, 1985). The premise underpinning the theory of marginalization is that 
traditionally dominant groups will try to defend their access to limited political resources. While 
the political and institutional environment of legislatures may vary significantly from country to 
country, the underrepresentation of women is consistent across all of Latin America. 
Accordingly, the introduction of women into legislatures in higher numbers shifts legislative 
dynamics throughout the entire region. This shift may concern the male group accustomed to 
being dominant as they worry about the distribution of scarce political resources, such as 
committee assignments and legislative leadership positions. When new groups arise in already 
established political parties, in this instance women, party incumbents have an incentive to limit 
the newcomers‟ access to those resources (Heath et al., 2005; Schwindt-Bayer, 2006). The 
incumbents also have considerable influence over resource distribution, keeping the new group 
outside of the legislative process and on the sidelines (Heath et al., 2005; Schwindt-Bayer, 2006).  
  There are several ways in which male legislators can perpetrate this marginalization, 
including controlling the treatment women receive once elected (Darcy, 1996:888-89). 
According to Heath et al. men can be, “patronizing and impolite to women, creating a hostile 
environment…” (2005: 422). This hostility may discourage women from running in future 
elections or successfully silence what would otherwise be opposition to incumbent-proposed 
legislation. It may also keep women from introducing legislation seen as woman-specific, as they 
fear increased hostility or come to believe that any policies introduced by women will simply be 
defeated (Heath et al., 2003).   
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Table 33 
Women in Leadership Positions (percentages) 
in Latin American Parliaments 
 
    Argentina Columbian Chamber Costa Rica 
    (1983-2001) (1994-2006) (1990-2006) 
 
Percent of Women in 
Chamber 14.6 12 21.5 
Committee Presidencies 12.1 11.4 25 
Committee vice presidents/ 18.9 7.3 29.6 
secretaries 
   
Women's Committees 
   
  % seats 61.4 48.2 
 
Social Committees 
   
  % seats 30.1 13.8 40.6 
Economic Committees 
   
  % seats 9.9 10.2 19.6 
Budget Committees 
   
  % seats 6.1 12 15 
Agriculture Committees 
   
  % seats 12.4 10 5.7 
Foreign Affairs Committees 
   
  % seats 7.3 6.6 23.1 
Source: Women in Parliament 
Marginalization also translates into the relegation of women to less influential positions such as 
being asked to chair committees which are typically considered to be of minor importance. 
Above, Table 33 breaks down the most common committee assignment(s) for women in Latin 
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America. This evidence supports the claim that most women occupy what are traditionally seen 
as „women‟s committees‟ (Kathlene, 1994).31 This can prove to be detrimental to women‟s 
political aspirations for any number of reasons. 
First, committees provide resources that help representatives win reelection (Heath et al., 
2005). But committee work also provides legislators with an opportunity to gain expertise in a 
particular policy area, making the types of committee assignment legislators receive key. As not 
all committees are equally important in a legislature, being excluded from those which carry 
more prestige (such as economic, budget, and foreign affairs committees) denies female 
legislators the opportunity to shape the policy upon which  a political career may be built (Heath 
et al., 2005; Schwindt-Bayer, 2006). The policymaking power or valuable political resources that 
come with “plum” committee assignments are thus stringently defended by the dominant male 
group, as they contain the power to develop, to modify, and to kill legislation (Heath et al, 2005).  
Thus, marginalization may have serious implications for women‟s participation in the 
legislative process. The idea that legislative marginalization may affect levels of SRW in Latin 
America is well-founded, considering the historical patriarchy of the region. Researchers agree 
that patriarchal culture generally disadvantages women, but how does this cultural legacy
32
 
specifically affect women‟s substantive representation in Latin America? Here we may consider 
a second possibility; a critical mass, or tipping point, may need to be reached in order for women 
to overcome the problems associated with legislative marginalization. Researchers have defined 
                                                          
31
 Women‟s issues committees deal explicitly with women and one for the primary locations of gender inequality --
the family and home (e.g., equality in the work place, protection against violence in the home). Social issues 
committees deal with issues traditionally thought to be women‟s interests (e.g., education, health care). Economic 
policy and foreign affairs are historically male-dominated areas that men may want to preserve for themselves 
(Heath et al., 2005: 421) 
32
 Please see Chapter II, Section 2 of this dissertation for a complete discussion of women and Latin American 
culture.  
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this critical mass in different ways, with estimates of the minimum presence of women necessary 
to overcome marginalization typically ranging from 15-30% (Bratton, 2005; Childs and Krook, 
2006; Childs and Withey, 2004; Studler and McAllister, 2002; Thomas, 1991). As research by 
Taylor-Robinson and Heath (2003) shows, the voting preferences of Latin American men and 
women often differ widely, with women voting for, and introducing, policies related to 
„women‟s issues‟ at a much higher rate than their male counterparts. If women cannot gain 
support for these policies from male legislators, the argument is that their voices are effectively 
silenced. In other words, they will serve as tokens (marginalized women) in the legislature until 
some critical mass necessary to push through women-specific policy is reached (Bratton, 2005). 
Thus, further research on legislative marginalization and critical mass theories may provide a 
theoretical framework upon which future research on SRW can be built.  
Another area of research to be considered lies in the implementation of electoral versus 
voluntary political party quotas. Chapter V provides some evidence to show that SRW is affected 
by the adoption of quotas. In line with the hypothesized relationships, as well as a developing 
literature (see: Baldez, 2006; Ballington and Matland, 2004; Schwindt-Bayer, 2009), voluntary 
quota laws often seem to be negatively related to SRW. On the other hand, electoral quota laws 
appear to have a more positive impact on SRW, though there is little statistical significance 
found. Overall, the findings from Chapter V suggest that the there are distinct outcomes for the 
adoption of each type of quota. These differences should be evaluated more stringently, as they 
may have important policy implications for Latin American, and other, leaders. 
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4. CONCLUSION 
It is indisputable that the number of women in Latin American politics has increased 
dramatically since the early 1990s. The common expectation is that women should be enjoying 
concomitant increases in quality of life, yet researchers have yet to uncover what institutional, or 
other, explanation best predicts levels of SRW. The evidence presented here suggests that more 
work is needed if we are to understand why the expected rise in SRW has not borne out. There is 
some statistical evidence to show that electoral, political party, and quota law institutions affect 
SRW. Yet overall, the findings of this dissertation lend further support to extant literature. When 
controlling for DRW, the variables comprising the three institutional categories have little, if 
any, impact on levels of SRW. This is not to say that these institutions are not related to SRW 
but rather that the nature of the relationship is unclear. Pursuing any of the research avenues 
outlined in the previous section may help better explicate this relationship and generate a 
substantial contribution to the scholarly literature on the state of SRW in Latin America.  
The findings here also reflect a need for better measures in studies of SRW. Although it 
is cost prohibitive for this project, collecting micro data at the policy level would allow 
researchers to have a better understanding of the real-world affects policies have on women‟s 
lives. Politicians and researchers could then formulate better, smarter policies aimed at women‟s 
substantive representation. However, the relative success of the CIRI variables in this 
dissertation‟s models supports the proposition that these indices have a place in SRW research 
and should continue to be used when appropriate for the study in question. This is a normative 
contribution that could help to inform future studies. Generally, as research in this area moves 
forward, improving the type of data available for study is tantamount to improving the field.  
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 While it is not happening as rapidly as many would like, the lives of Latin American 
women are still improving overall. If we wish to increase the speed of this progress, researchers 
must dig deeper into coding specific legislative policies, studying institutional arrangements, and 
collecting reliable data to be used in holistic qualitative and quantitative studies of SRW. For 
now, the conclusion reached by this dissertation is relatively simple; increases in the descriptive 
representation of women leads to increases in the substantive representation of women. Electoral, 
party, and quota law institutions matter but only when controlling for DRW. In the context of the 
results reported across Chapters III, IV, and V, the extant literature is correct. However, there are 
almost certainly intervening factors affecting SRW which remain unaccounted for. We must 
continue to work to expose these variables and to explore new avenues of theory if we desire to 
craft meaningful ways with which to improve the lives of women not just in Latin America but 
everywhere.  
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